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Constitutional law scholarship often focuses on two taxonomies: doctrinal cate-
gories and interpretive methodologies. Consequently, constitutional scholars some-
times neglect other important facets of constitutional decisionmaking, particularly
extra-doctrinal stealth determinations that courts render frequently in constitutional
opinions. The U.S. Supreme Court regularly confronts the questions underlying these
determinations, but despite their centrality to constitutional decisionmaking, these
issues often escape careful scrutiny.
Lawrence v. Texas exemplifies the phenomenon. Lawrence framed its central ques-
tion at a broad level of generality; relied on hybrid reasoning, using equal-protection
rationales to support a substantive due process holding; declined to identify a level of
scrutiny; and invoked changing public opinion. Each of these moves helped the Court
reach its outcome, but, significantly, the Court inadequately theorized each, leaving
considerable doubt about how it would approach similar inquiries in future cases. The
result is legal uncertainty. For example, cases challenging the constitutionality of state
same-sex marriage bans will likely confront many of the same sub-doctrinal determi-
nations that Lawrence purported to resolve. However, because Lawrence did so little
to justify its resolution of those determinations, the Court has little to guide it when
confronting those determinations again in a marriage case—or any case.
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Such opacity threatens judicial transparency, consistency, and predictability. That
being said, stealth determinations, paradoxically, also can help reinforce judicial legiti-
macy by accounting for cultural norms and providing the Court with flexibility while
still preserving the appearance of impartiality. Stealth determinations, then, can simul-
taneously undermine and fortify judicial legitimacy, thus reflecting deep tensions in
the Court’s approach to constitutional adjudication.
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional scholars often focus on two dominant taxonomies. The first is
straightforward doctrinal categorization. Courts, casebooks, and treatises organize
cases by the constitutional provision they address.1 Hence, we have a commerce
clause doctrine, an equal protection doctrine, a free speech doctrine. The second
1 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
(4th ed. 2011) (organizing constitutional law by different doctrines).
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well-known constitutional taxonomy organizes different interpretive approaches,
what Philip Bobbitt calls “modalities.”2 These modalities include arguments rooted
in constitutional history, text, structure, precedent, and so on.3
Both these taxonomies are useful ways of organizing issues of constitutional law
and interpretation. However, because they tend to think about the Constitution through
these categories, judges and even constitutional scholars have often neglected other
important facets of constitutional decisionmaking. In particular, they have paid inade-
quate attention to sub-doctrinal determinations that courts, especially the U.S. Supreme
Court, render frequently in constitutional opinions. These determinations have re-
ceived short shrift from both judges and scholars, yet they play a crucial role in courts’
efforts to decide constitutional cases across various substantive doctrines.
Lawrence v. Texas4 is a prime example of a case relying on many of these stealth
determinations. Lawrence famously held unconstitutional Texas’s law criminalizing
same-sex sodomy.5 But though Lawrence’s holding is clear, its implications are not.6
A decade after Lawrence, the Court is now confronting a new generation of gay-rights
cases, involving the constitutionality of states’ same-sex marriage bans and portions
of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).7 One would be forgiven for thinking
that Lawrence, probably the Court’s most prominent gay-rights case, should hold clues
about how the Court will approach these cases. On closer view, however, Lawrence
turned on a series of under-theorized, stealth determinations. It framed the question at
a broad level of generality; relied on hybrid reasoning, using equal protection ratio-
nales to support a due process holding; declined to identify a level of scrutiny; and
invoked changing public opinion.8 Each of these moves helped the Court reach its
2 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11–22 (1991).
3 See id. at 12–13.
4 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
5 See id. at 578–79.
6 See Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1585 (2004) (“[T]he most salient characteristic of Lawrence is the
impossibility of determining what it means . . . .”).
7 See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006); infra Part II.A.
8 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. One perhaps could add to the list the fact that Lawrence
overruled existing constitutional precedent, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), without
sufficient explanation. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78; see also id. at 587–88 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). However, while the Court’s discussion of stare decisis is hardly satisfying, it is
more thorough than the Court’s analysis of the other determinations discussed here. Indeed,
while the Court’s approach to constitutional precedent is inconsistent, its treatment of the
matter, however controversial, is sufficiently developed in places that it probably does not fall
within the spectrum of stealthiness examined here. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855–56 (1992). This is certainly not to say that the Court’s approach to
constitutional precedent is beyond reproach or not worthy of sustained analysis, but rather to
suggest that stare decisis determinations are of a somewhat different character than the stealth
determinations this Article examines. See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF
PRECEDENT (2008).
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outcome, but, significantly, the Court inadequately explained each, leaving consider-
able doubt about how it would approach similar determinations in future cases.
The point here is not to condemn Lawrence’s outcome, which I believe was
correct, but rather to use it to illustrate a broader phenomenon in constitutional deci-
sionmaking. Indeed, Lawrence’s reliance on these stealth determinations was hardly
anomalous. To the contrary, such determinations arise frequently in constitutional
cases, and, indeed, are inherent in many cases the Court confronts.9 Yet, despite their
common recurrence, the Supreme Court often fails to explain thoroughly its reason-
ing when it renders these determinations.10 Consequently, the Court usually fails to
reflect these determinations in black-letter doctrine (such as the tiers of scrutiny, the
substantial effects test, and so on).11 It also fails to reconcile adequately these deter-
minations across cases.12 As a result, its approach to a given determination in one case
often lacks precedential effect, even when the Court confronts a similar determination
in a similar case.13 The Court moreover often fails to explain just how central these
determinations are to the resolution of some cases.14 Consequently, it is very difficult
for litigants, lower courts, and even future Justices to know how to handle these kinds
of determinations in a predictable manner. Indeed, it is hard to say the extent to which
they enjoy the status of law.15
In exploring this area, one must distinguish between the questions underlying these
stealth determinations and the Court’s explanations for the determinations it renders.
The questions underlying these determinations are often inherent in the cases and the
doctrine itself. For example, substantive due process cases often force courts to decide
(implicitly or explicitly) the level of generality at which courts should construe an as-
serted unenumerated liberty.16 In that sense, the level-of-generality determination is an
often under-examined facet of the Court’s substantive due process analysis. In another
sense, though, the Court’s explanations for its level-of-generality determinations—and
other stealth determinations—are so under-developed that they should be conceived
of as distinct from the doctrines they modify. Indeed, it is the Court’s failure to address
these questions in consistent, rigorous ways that renders them stealthy.
9 See Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision Making,
98 IOWA L. REV. 465 (2013).





15 Cf. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and
the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1909–11 (2011) (questioning whether principles of
statutory interpretation enjoy the status of law). See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY
OF LAW 33–44 (2d ed. 1969); JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY
OF LAW 210, 212–19 (1979).
16 See infra Parts I.B.1 & II.B.1.
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Of course, some of these determinations are stealthier than others, so we should
conceive of “stealth” as existing on a continuum with varying degrees of explication.
Sometimes the Court fails to identify a determination altogether; other times, it ac-
knowledges the determination but fails to explain adequately its resolution. Signifi-
cantly, though, whether invisible or opaque, the Court’s analysis often confidently
proceeds without reference to the kinds of professional legal norms that usually guide
judicial decisionmaking in other areas.17
The Court’s recent interest in gay rights provides good reason to revisit Lawrence’s
opacity on a number of these issues. As this Article entered production, the Court had
just granted certiorari in two prominent gay rights cases: Hollingsworth v. Perry,18
which considers the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8,19 and United States
v. Windsor,20 which considers the constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA. These cases
could turn on numerous issues, many only tangentially related to Lawrence. But both
cases also present many of the same kinds of sub-doctrinal questions that arose in
Lawrence, especially Perry, in which the Court conceivably could resolve the consti-
tutionality of same-sex marriage bans.21
17 See LIEF H. CARTER & THOMAS F. BURKE, REASON IN LAW 146 (8th ed. 2010) (arguing
that the rule of law requires judges to consult factors “outside [their] own will for criteria of
judgment”); Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court,
119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 40–41 (2005) (discussing professional legal norms that usually guide
judicial decisionmaking); see also Berger, supra note 9, at 470.
18 See 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (granting certiorari).
19 In Perry, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court ruling striking down as unconsti-
tutional California’s Proposition 8. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.), cert. granted
sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). Proposition 8, a 2008 California
ballot initiative, had amended the state constitution to provide that “only marriage between
a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California,” CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5, thereby
overriding a California Supreme Court decision ruling that same-sex marriage prohibitions
were unconstitutional under state constitutional law. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384
(Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, Cal. Const. art. 1, § 7.5. Though the
Court could use Perry to decide the constitutionality of all same-sex marriage bans, it could
avoid the substantive issue by holding that Proposition 8’s proponents lack Article III standing.
See Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (requiring parties to brief the standing issue). Even if the Court does
reach the substantive merits, it could still decide the case on narrow grounds, as did the Ninth
Circuit, which emphasized that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional because it withdrew, without
a legitimate reason, same-sex marriage rights to people who already possessed that right and
enjoyed all the attendant benefits of marriage under California law. See Perry, 671 F.3d at
1063. In all events, whether in Perry or elsewhere, the Court will likely eventually address
whether a state can constitutionally deny same-sex marriage. Such consideration will probably
force the Court to turn to some of the same kinds of sub-doctrinal determinations it left un-
developed in Lawrence. See infra Part II.
20 See 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (granting certiorari).
21 It is probably more likely that the Court will decide Perry on either justiciability grounds
or narrow substantive grounds, though the Court certainly could choose to resolve the larger
question. See supra note 19.
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Indeed, whether in Perry or a subsequent case, the Court is likely to decide the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans in the not-so-distant future, and, when it
does, it will have to decide how seriously to take Lawrence’s stealth determinations.
For example, as in Lawrence, the Court deciding a same-sex marriage case will need
to decide at what level of generality to frame the question. At a high level of general-
ity, the issue may be framed as whether one has the right to marry the person of one’s
choosing. At a narrower level, the right may be understood to extend only to one un-
married man and one unmarried woman.22 Lawrence framed its question at a broad
level, but because it offered sparse justification for why that framing was appropriate,
it is hard to know what should guide the level of generality in other cases.23 This is just
one example. As discussed below, many of Lawrence’s sub-doctrinal questions are
likely to recur in a same-sex marriage case, and yet the Court has said little about how
to approach each question.
Indeterminacy, of course, is part of constitutional law. Even black-letter doctrine
can be maddeningly unpredictable and easily manipulated.24 Nevertheless, black-letter
doctrine is at least typically guided by more predictable inquiries within various doc-
trinal categories.25 By contrast, the Court does not even make clear what factors it con-
siders when it renders these stealth determinations.
Stealth determinations are of obvious interest to the pragmatic litigator, who will
want to know what unarticulated factors help drive the Court’s decisionmaking. But
they are also important to the constitutional theorist, because they obscure important
constitutional meta-issues simmering beneath the surface of many cases. For instance,
framing an inquiry broadly will typically make it easier for a court to protect an as-
serted right. Accordingly, underlying the level-of-generality determination is a broader
issue about whether our Constitution generally privileges unenumerated individual
liberties or democratic rule when the two collide. Similarly, questions about whether
and how courts consider public opinion during their constitutional deliberations impli-
cate whether courts generally should construe the Constitution largely to track majori-
tarian preferences. And questions about whether to apply the tiers of scrutiny or blur
doctrinal categories into hybrid rights raise questions about how formalistically judges
should apply constitutional doctrine.
22 See infra Part II.B.1.
23 See infra Part I.B.1.
24 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 291, 294–95 (2005)
(explaining his decision to stop writing his treatise on constitutional law by arguing that “no
treatise . . . can be true to this moment in our constitutional history”).
25 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994) (declaring
content-discriminatory speech restrictions subject to strict scrutiny); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (identifying injury, causation, and redressability as
the elements of Article III standing); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493–94 (1989) (determining that any discrimination based on race triggers strict scrutiny);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1964) (applying the substantial effects test
to find Congress did have commerce clause authority for passing the Civil Rights Act).
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Strikingly, the Court does not carefully discuss these issues in Lawrence or else-
where. These may be difficult questions, but, like the doctrines and modalities, they are
at the heart of constitutional decisionmaking. Indeed, the Court often dismisses these
determinations as minor points in a larger legal analysis, even though they shape con-
stitutional outcomes in overarching, fundamental ways. By failing to grapple with these
recurring determinations in a thoughtful, principled manner, judges not only create great
legal uncertainty but also fail to develop a coherent, rigorous constitutional vision.26
There are, of course, explanations for this stealth, both in Lawrence and more
generally.27 One explanation might pin Lawrence’s stealth determinations on its author,
Justice Kennedy, but these under-developed determinations recur across many con-
stitutional cases, so the phenomenon cannot be pinned solely on one judicial author.28
Another explanation is that the Court uses stealth determinations to help preserve its
flexibility. By failing to develop their reasoning, Justices avoid tying their hands in
future cases.29 Under-theorized opinions can also help secure the votes of a majority
of Justices, who may agree on an outcome but not the underlying reasoning.30 Stealth
determinations, furthermore, may reflect courts’ efforts to reconcile cultural trends with
doctrinal obstacles.31 By 2003, large portions of the American public deemed anti-
sodomy laws morally unacceptable,32 but preexisting doctrine, especially Bowers v.
Hardwick,33 still made Lawrence a challenging case. On this account, stealth deter-
minations helped the Court take account of changing cultural norms, weave around
doctrinal obstacles, and still craft an opinion that sounded (more or less) like law.
The Court, then, has understandable reasons for its practices, but the phenomenon’s
costs and benefits still deserve careful scrutiny. In one sense, these determinations
undermine the rule of law; it is, quite simply, unclear whether a determination in one
case carries any precedential value in another. Indeed, the Court’s erratic and non-
transparent approach to these determinations gives the impression that constitutional
law is mostly ad hoc, shaped on a case-by-case basis by results-oriented judges.
26 See infra Part III.A; cf. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
27 See infra Part III.B.
28 For example, as I have explored elsewhere, the Court has failed to offer a coherent,
consistent approach to its institutionally based deference determinations. See, e.g., Berger,
supra note 9, at 470–82.
29 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1996) (arguing that judicial minimalism reduces “the
costs of decision and the costs of mistake”).
30 See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 1733, 1771 (1995) (“A key task for a legal system is to enable people who disagree on
first principles to converge on outcomes in particular cases. Incompletely theorized agreements
help to produce judgments on relative particulars amidst conflict on relative abstractions.”).
31 See infra Parts III.B & III.C.2.
32 See infra Part I.A.
33 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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In another sense, however, stealth determinations also help provide the Court with
the tools it feels it needs to resolve cases wisely.34 The Court’s use of stealth determi-
nations may deprive its decisions of consistency, predictability, and transparency, but
they also may make it easier for the Court to craft law reflecting contemporary cultural
norms.35 Of course, the Court could still explain these determinations more candidly,
but such candor, for all its advantages, would also have costs. The illusion that there
are impartial principles guiding courts’ decisionmaking is part of what attracts people
to judicial dispute resolution, and blunt candor may shatter that myth.36 Paradoxically,
then, stealth determinations may simultaneously undermine and reinforce judicial
legitimacy, on the one hand rendering constitutional law even more indeterminate than
it already is, on the other hand accounting for societal pressures while preserving legal
language’s appearance of impartiality.
Part I of this Article illustrates the concept of stealth determinations by explor-
ing several sub-doctrinal decisions that the Court insufficiently justified in Lawrence.
Part II examines how those determinations create great legal uncertainty in the related
area of same-sex marriage. Part III considers explanations for, and implications of,
these stealth determinations and contends that they reflect deep tensions in our legal
system. Indeed, stealth constitutional determinations, paradoxically, may both under-
mine and reinforce judicial legitimacy.
I. LAWRENCE’S STEALTH DETERMINATIONS
A. The Easiness and Difficulty of Lawrence
Lawrence was simultaneously a hard case and an exceptionally easy one. In one
sense, its outcome seems inevitable. By 2003, a criminal ban on sodomy was out of
step with contemporary American norms.37 Police rarely enforced the law against acts
committed in the home.38 In fact, in the entire 143-year history of the Texas sodomy
law, no publicly reported court case involved the enforcement of the law against
34 Cf. Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L.
REV. 851, 902 (2009) (“Emotional common sense represents one way in which law may pass
contentious judgments of value on by passing them off as uncontestable matters of fact.”).
35 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality,
and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 33–39 (outlining the advantages and disadvantages
of following the Bowers’s precedent in Lawrence).
36 See Keith J. Bybee, The Rule of Law Is Dead! Long Live the Rule of Law!, in WHAT’S
LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? 306, 314 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011); infra Part III.C.
37 See Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV.
431, 443 (2005) (“Lawrence . . . came in the wake of extraordinary changes in attitudes and
practices regarding homosexuality.”); Sunstein, supra note 35, at 73 (“[A] criminal ban on
sodomy [was] hopelessly out of accord with contemporary convictions.”).
38 See DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 8 (2012).
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consensual sex between adults in private.39 Moreover, a large segment of Americans
found such laws repulsive and contrary to basic conceptions of liberty.40 Indeed, by
2003, most states had repealed their anti-sodomy laws, and only four had statutes
singling out homosexual sodomy for criminal punishment.41
By these measures, anti-sodomy laws quite simply lacked “a plausible foundation
in widely shared moral commitments.”42 Laws of this sort are problematic both be-
cause they are out of step with cultural norms, and also because they give police and
prosecutors great authority to selectively enforce widely disregarded laws.43 Thus, as
Professor Cass Sunstein has argued, Lawrence in this regard reflects the old English
concept of desuetude, under which “due process principles requiring fair notice, and
banning arbitrary action, are violated if criminal prosecution is brought on the basis
of moral judgments lacking public support.”44
Moreover, anti-sodomy laws imposed harsh burdens on homosexuals extending
far beyond the prohibition of particular sexual acts. Texas’s statute branded homo-
sexuals as presumptive criminals, making it much more difficult for them to be treated
like other members of society.45 A conviction for violation of a sodomy statute further
would restrict a person’s “ability to engage in a variety of professions, including medi-
cine, athletic training, and interior design.”46 It would also require that person to register
as a sex offender in some states.47 To the extent Lawrence invalidated a legal regime
that was unpopular, anachronistic, rarely enforced, and astoundingly cruel, it was un-
usually easy as Supreme Court constitutional cases go.
In another sense, though, Lawrence was not easy at all. Doctrinal obstacles posed
serious problems for the petitioners, most notably Bowers v. Hardwick, which had
upheld a similar law seventeen years earlier.48 The majority may have felt that it had
no other choice than to invalidate the statute, but it also knew that striking down the
statute, especially on substantive due process grounds, may create potentially unwel-
come doctrinal ripples.49
39 Id. at 13.
40 See Klarman, supra note 37, at 443.
41 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003); Sunstein, supra note 35, at 40 (refer-
encing the low number of states that forbid homosexual conduct as evidence of an emerging
awareness that liberty protects an adult’s right to decide how to conduct his or her private life).
42 Sunstein, supra note 35, at 73.
43 See, e.g., CARPENTER, supra note 38, at xiv.
44 Sunstein, supra note 35, at 27–28.
45 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
46 Id.
47 See id.
48 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Klarman, supra note 37, at 432–39.
49 See Klarman, supra note 37, at 436–37; Sunstein, supra note 35, at 34 (“For the majority,
a central problem was to develop a rationale that would strike down the Texas statute without
producing an unintended revolution in the law.”).
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Instead of candidly addressing these pressures, the Court simply avoided explaining
many of the moves it made.50 The decision rests on a series of stealth, under-theorized
determinations. These determinations are not formally part of the black-letter doctrine,
but they were a central part of the Court’s reasoning, and they shed light not only
on Lawrence itself but also on the nature of judicial constitutional decisionmaking
more generally.51
B. Stealth Determinations in Lawrence
This Part explores four of Lawrence’s stealth determinations that were inade-
quately explained yet important to the outcome of the case. The point here is not to
critique Lawrence’s outcome but rather to use its under-developed reasoning to illus-
trate various examples of stealth determinations. Of course, the Court relies on stealth
determinations in many other cases. Lawrence, however, relies especially heavily on
them and therefore nicely illustrates the broader phenomenon.52
1. Levels of Generality
Lawrence turned substantially on the level of generality at which the Court charac-
terized the issues involved. At one level, this determination does not seem stealthy in-
sofar as the Court expressly rejected Bowers’s selected level of generality. Bowers, the
Court explained, had asked “whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental
right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the
many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long
time.”53 Such a formulation was inappropriate. “To say that the issue in Bowers was
simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct,” Lawrence explained, “demeans
the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it
to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.”54
This decision to reject Bowers’s narrow framing reshaped the case. Under Bowers’s
approach, the respondent did not stand a chance, because it would be virtually impos-
sible to establish that homosexual sodomy was a “fundamental right [that is] ‘deeply
50 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 46 (“The conventional doctrinal categories and terms
are simply missing [in Lawrence].”); Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, Lawrence v. Texas: The
“Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004)
(noting that Lawrence leaves “a good bit . . . to the reader’s imagination”).
51 For ease of presentation, this Article addresses each determination separately, though
they do overlap and interact in important ways.
52 I have begun to explore these stealth determinations in other contexts elsewhere, see
generally Berger, supra note 9, and will continue to do so in future work.
53 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566–67 (2003) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190).
54 Id. at 567.
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rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”55 Lawrence, by contrast, declined to say
precisely what right was at issue or whether it was fundamental. Instead, it emphasized
that the case was about liberty more generally, essentially dooming the challenged
law. Thus, the Court adopted a “presumption of liberty,” requiring the government
to justify its restriction on liberty, rather than placing the burden on the individual
to establish that the liberty asserted is “fundamental.”56 Such a libertarian presumption
may be justifiable,57 but it also conflicts with a prominent strain of substantive due pro-
cess analysis, which asks whether an asserted right is “deeply rooted in [the] Nation’s
history and tradition.”58 It also discourages democratic deliberation insofar as it invites
courts to announce new rights, thus removing some issues from the sphere of political
debate.59 It is therefore striking that the Court treated the level-of-generality determina-
tion almost casually without acknowledging its potential import.
Indeed, though the Court expressly rejected Bowers’s selected level of generality,
it provided minimal guidance on precisely how the question should be framed and why
a broader framing was appropriate. The Court did emphasize that the challenged law
had “far-reaching consequences,”60 but it is unclear why the consequences of a statute
necessarily should affect the level of generality at which it is reviewed. Many statutes
that prohibit certain behavior have “far-reaching consequences” not immediately evi-
dent on the law’s face,61 but that fact does not always dictate that the right asserted
55 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191–92. Even though Bowers failed to recognize that early sodomy
laws were not directed at homosexuals specifically but rather all non-procreative sexual activity,
see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 26–34 (1999), a more historically accurate analysis would have
been unlikely to suggest that homosexual sodomy was a fundamental right deeply rooted in
American history.
56 See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas,
2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 32–35 (noting that Lawrence demonstrates not that sexual
liberty is a fundamental right but rather that “same-sex sexual freedom is a legitimate aspect
of liberty”).
57 See generally id.
58 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); see, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1281 (2005) (“Deliberation
by elected legislators is more reliable and more legitimate in solving problems and accommo-
dating groups than deliberation by unelected judges.”).
60 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
61 See Deborah Ahrens, Methademic: Drug Panic in an Age of Ambivalence, 37 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 841, 870–71 (2010) (arguing that recent regulations requiring pharmacies to sell the
essential ingredients of methamphetamine behind the counter may have led meth laboratories
to shift their strategies with some pernicious results); Amanda Moghaddam, Popular Politics
and Unintended Consequences: The Punitive Effect of Sex Offender Residency Statutes from
an Empirical Perspective, 40 SW. L. REV. 223, 225 (2010) (arguing that the unintended 
776 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 21:765
be framed broadly. Washington v. Glucksberg,62 for instance, framed the liberty at
issue narrowly as “a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance
in doing so.”63 Laws prohibiting the assistance of suicide surely have “far-reaching
consequences,” including the prolonged physical and psychological suffering of the
terminally ill, the prolonged hardship of the patient’s family, and increased health
care costs for private families and society more generally.64 Nevertheless, the Court
stuck with its narrow question—a right to physician assisted suicide—rather than a
broader liberty, such as the right to make one’s own health decisions or even the right
to be free from arbitrary restraint.65 Glucksberg justified its selected level of generality
no more persuasively than did Lawrence, but nevertheless, in light of Glucksberg,
Lawrence’s suggestion that the level of generality turns on a proscription’s conse-
quences is unconvincing.
Lawrence also suggested that a broader level of generality was appropriate be-
cause the challenged statute touched “upon the most private human conduct, sexual
behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”66 This explanation makes more
sense, given that the Court has previously protected both sexual decisionmaking and
privacy in the home.67 Nevertheless, the Court nowhere explained why those issues
should affect how a question is framed, as opposed to the degree of rigor with which
the challenged policy is reviewed. Nor did the Court rely on that argument to explic-
itly reject the tradition-based strand of substantive due process in favor of a more
libertarian personal-autonomy strand.68 To be sure, this explanation is coherent, but
the Court does not develop its precise place in the doctrinal reasoning.
In short, Lawrence purported to correct Bowers’s erroneously parsimonious level
of generality,69 but it offered no theory for thinking about levels of generality more
consequences of sex offender residency statutes include homelessness, unenforceability, and
psychological harm).
62 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
63 Id. at 723.
64 Cf. id. at 772 (Souter, J., concurring) (discussing the problem of levels of generality).
65 See id. at 752.
66 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
67 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding that information ob-
tained from thermal imaging of marijuana plants growing in a home constituted a search and
implicated expectations of privacy in the home); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (discussing bodily integrity and decisional autonomy); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 566–67 (1969) (striking down laws forbidding private possession of obscenity).
68 Compare Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (“[T]he Due Process
Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ . . . .” (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977))), with Casey, 505 U.S. at 857 (recognizing a “personal autonomy”
strand of substantive due process).
69 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (arguing that Bowers “misapprehended the claim of
liberty there presented to it”).
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generally.70 Nor did it acknowledge that underlying its selected level of generality
was a fundamental decision about how to approach unenumerated individual liberties
more generally.71 Lawrence may well be correct that courts should frame questions
involving such rights broadly,72 but, if so, it should have defended such a libertarian
approach and tried to reconcile, or at least acknowledge, conflicting precedent like
Glucksberg.73 The Court’s failure to engage with these issues adequately here is hardly
anomalous. To the extent Glucksberg adopted a presumption of constitutionality rather
than of liberty, it, too, inadequately justified its choice from among competing theories
of substantive due process.74 Indeed, many liberty cases turn on the level of generality
at which the Court considers the question,75 and yet, the Court often accepts a partic-
ular framing without carefully explaining why that approach is more appropriate than
an alternative.76 Of course, it is difficult to develop an approach that will operate satis-
factorily across cases, especially in the individual-rights setting, in which each case will
present particulars the Court will want to examine on a case-by-case basis. The Court
presumably shies away from a broader theory of levels of generality precisely because
it wants flexibility in future cases.77 It is still noteworthy, however, that in correcting
70 For a scholarly theory, see Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality
in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1059 (1990) (“[T]he search for unenumer-
ated rights should proceed by interpolation and extrapolation from the enumerated rights. . . .
[A] typical judicial opinion distinguishes between essential and non-essential facts, and . . .
by paying attention to such distinctions, judges trained in the method of the common law can
generalize from prior cases without merely imposing their own values.”).
71 See infra Part III.A.
72 But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127–28 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality)
(proposing that the most value-neutral method of framing questions of generality is “the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted
right can be identified”).
73 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (“We must therefore exercise the utmost care whenever
we are asked to break new ground in this field, lest the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court.” (cita-
tions omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Tribe, supra note 50, at 1923 (explaining
that Glucksberg “zeroed in only on the specific ‘act’ of prescribing or providing a terminally
ill patient with a deliberately lethal dose of a drug with the intent not of ameliorating his pain
but of helping the patient to hasten his death”).
74 See Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63,
66–68 (2006) (contrasting three theories of substantive due process, including a “theory of his-
torical tradition,” a “theory of reasoned judgment,” and a “theory of evolving national values”).
75 See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 560 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., con-
curring) (“Level of generality is destiny in interpretive disputes . . . .”); Tribe & Dorf, supra
note 70, at 1058.
76 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (failing to justify its decision
characterizing the State’s interest as having the Amish go to school until they are 16 rather than
an interest in education more generally).
77 See infra Part III.B.
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what it identifies as Bowers’s chief failing, the Lawrence Court made only a minimal
effort to explain precisely when and why broader levels of generality are appropriate.
2. Doctrinal Categorization and Hybrid Constitutional Rights
Though the Court purported to decide Lawrence as a substantive due process
case (with Justice O’Connor concurring on equal protection grounds),78 in reality it
combined due process and equal protection reasoning.79 Rather than treating the case
solely as a liberty issue, the Court blurred doctrinal categories, intertwining liberty and
equality arguments. In so doing, it emphasized the stigmatic effects of the Texas law
and petitioners’ dignity interests,80 neither of which fit neatly into pre-existing substan-
tive due process doctrine.81
Indeed, though we typically think of liberty and equality as doctrinally distinct,
they naturally complement each other, especially in this context.82 As Professor Pam
Karlan has argued, “sometimes looking at an issue stereoscopically—through the
lenses of both the due process clause and the equal protection clause—can have syn-
ergistic effects, producing results that neither clause might reach by itself.”83 Because
states rarely enforce laws against private sexual conduct, the real problem of such laws
targeting specifically homosexual conduct is that they “undergird” discrimination,
sending the message to “gay people that their choices . . . are unworthy of respect.”84
The Texas statute, then, singled out homosexuals for a particular deprivation of lib-
erty and dignity, thereby imposing other far-reaching stigmatic effects on their lives.85
78 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (stating that the case should be resolved
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., con-
curring) (“I base my conclusion on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.”).
79 See id. at 575 (majority opinion) (“Equality of treatment and the due process right to
demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in
important respects . . . .”).
80 Id. (emphasizing that the law “demeans the lives of homosexual persons”); see also id.
(“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and
of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public
and in the private spheres.”).
81 See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 776–87 (2011)
(discussing liberty-based dignity arguments).
82 See Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1458
(2004) (arguing that Lawrence was “as much a claim about equality as it is a claim about
liberty”); Tribe, supra note 50, at 1898 (“[D]ue process and equal protection, far from having
separate missions and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal double
helix.”); Yoshino, supra note 81, at 779 (“Lawrence was not a simple liberty case, but one
with undertones of equality.”).
83 Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth
Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 (2002).
84 Karlan, supra note 82, at 1453.
85 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 581–82 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the Texas
statute “brands all homosexuals as criminals, thereby making it more difficult for homosexuals
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Lawrence, thus, must be understood through the lens of this discrimination, which iden-
tified homosexuals as a class of citizens deserving of social subordination.86 Because
more traditional due process analyses would have had more difficulty emphasizing
these dignity and stigma claims, a hybrid analysis captured the essence of the harm in
a way that traditional doctrinal inquiries could not.87
More rigid due process or equal protection analyses, by contrast, each faced sub-
stantial doctrinal obstacles that would have made it more difficult to invalidate the
Texas law. Due process case law sometimes roots liberty claims in historical tradition,88
and the petitioners would have had a hard time claiming that same-sex sodomy was
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”89 Bowers, indeed, rejected this
very argument.90 Moreover, had the Court approached Lawrence solely on liberty
grounds, it would have been more difficult to strike down the statute without announc-
ing a new fundamental right, something the Court is often reluctant to do.91 Similarly,
while precedent like Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey92 may
support a constitutional right to personal autonomy for life’s most intimate decisions,
the Court could not have relied primarily on that doctrinal strain without explaining
why it should apply instead of Bowers’s tradition-based approach to due process.
Straightforward equal protection analysis was probably the easier doctrinal route
to strike down the Texas law, given that the statute on its face, unlike the Georgia law
at issue in Bowers, prohibited homosexual but not heterosexual sodomy. Nevertheless,
the equal protection argument also presented difficulties, and, perhaps consequently,
only Justice O’Connor sought to resolve the case solely on equality grounds.93 For
one, an equal protection holding would have preserved Bowers, thus affirming the
dubious principle that the state may intrude on consenting adults in their bedrooms,
an outcome likely contrary to many Americans’ norms.94
to be treated in the same manner as everyone else”); see also Karlan, supra note 82, at 1453–54
(explaining that the law treated homosexuals as presumptive criminals).
86 See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 98 (2003) (emphasizing that the
Texas statute imposed a second class citizenship on a class of persons); Sunstein, supra note 35,
at 32 (arguing that Lawrence cannot be understood without reference to the social subordination
imposed by the Texas law on gays and lesbians); Tribe, supra note 50, at 1943 (arguing that
sodomy prohibitions “locked an entire segment of the population into a subordinate status”).
87 See Yoshino, supra note 81, at 749–50.
88 See Conkle, supra note 74, at 83–98 (describing the “theory of historical tradition” that
guides some, but hardly all, substantive due process decisions).
89 See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
90 See supra notes 49–50, 54–69 and accompanying text.
91 See Klarman, supra note 37, at 437 (indicating that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy
usually avoid announcing new fundamental rights).
92 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
93 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
94 See supra Part I.A.
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Moreover, a holding resting only on equal protection may have had to contend with
a deferential level of scrutiny.95 In Romer v. Evans,96 the Court applied only rational
basis review to a law burdening homosexuals, albeit, most observers agree, “rational
basis with bite.”97 Admittedly, Romer said nothing to foreclose the application of a
higher level of scrutiny to classifications on the basis of sexuality, but the Court has
generally been disinclined to identify new suspect classes.98
Of course, rational-basis review would not necessarily have been fatal to the
petitioners’ case in Lawrence.99 There are certainly strong arguments that anti-sodomy
laws are irrational.100 These arguments are even stronger when the prohibitions apply
only to one unpopular segment of the population.101 Nevertheless, as Professor Michael
95 See Post, supra note 86, at 100 (arguing that by relying on due process, the Court in
Lawrence avoided having to decide whether classifications based on sexual orientation trigger
heightened scrutiny).
96 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
97 See id. at 631–32; Yoshino, supra note 81, at 761–62 (discussing Romer and other cases
ostensibly applying “rational basis with bite”).
98 See Yoshino, supra note 81, at 755–63 (arguing that the Court tries to avoid granting
a new classification for the benefit of heightened scrutiny due to “pluralism anxiety”).
99 There is, in fact, an argument that Lawrence silently applied rational basis review. See
infra Part I.B.3.
100 Morality might be one ostensibly “rational” justification for such a law, but, as Lawrence
itself indicated, moral disapproval, without more, is a flimsy rationale for prohibiting behavior
that harms no one. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Lawrence
signaled the demise of legislation resting solely on society’s moral opprobrium); Suzanne
B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based
Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1979–80 (2006) (noting that Lawrence deviated from
Bowers’s declaration that homosexuality was rightfully the subject of moral disapproval but
did not acknowledge that it had done so). Moreover, given that sodomy laws were out of step
with most Americans’ values by 2003, it is not even clear that morality adequately justified the
law. See supra Part I.A. Another ostensibly rational basis for supporting the law is that same-
sex sodomy creates public health risks, such as the spread of diseases like HIV. See Richard F.
Duncan & Gary L. Young, Homosexual Rights and Citizen Initiatives: Is Constitutionalism
Unconstitutional?, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 93, 104 n.54 (1995). This
argument is also weak, because anti-sodomy laws were very rarely enforced. E.g., CARPENTER,
supra note 38, at 8. Were the statute in question a genuine health regulation, the state, presum-
ably, would seek to actually enforce it. Moreover, such a public health regulation would have
been simultaneously terrifically over-broad (because the law would sweep in many healthy,
monogamous same-sex couples whose behavior in no way risked the spread of disease) and
under-broad (because the law ignored vast amounts of other behavior, including heterosexual
sexual activity, creating public health risks). That over-breadth and under-breath collectively
signal that this was not really a health regulation, but rather a law announcing and perpetuating
the inferior status of an unpopular social group. Such laws do not enjoy the benefit of the most
deferential form of rational basis review. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (“[L]aws of the kind now
before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity
toward the class of persons affected.”).
101 See Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable
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Klarman points out, courts often extend “extreme deference” in rational basis cases.102
This characterization might somewhat overstate the point—the most deferential rational
basis review typically occurs in cases involving economic regulations103—but, even
so, it is certainly more difficult to invalidate a law applying an ostensibly deferential
level of scrutiny.
Instead of confronting the doctrinal limitations posed by “pure” due process and
equal protection analyses, the Court linked the two analyses together. This conflation
seems normatively and logically persuasive in Lawrence itself, but the Court did not
explain when such “stereoscopic” inquiries are appropriate.104 The Court has previously
suggested that rights working in tandem may amount to something more than either
right would on its own,105 but it has not provided guidance for thinking about what
factors justify escaping more conventional doctrinal categorization. Lawrence, then,
teaches us that liberty and equality can interact with each other in important ways, but
it tells us very little about when and how such constitutional borrowing is appropriate.106
3. Tiers of Scrutiny
Many constitutional cases turn on the tier of scrutiny. The old adage that strict
scrutiny is “strict in theory and fatal in fact”107 is an overstatement,108 but the level of
scrutiny certainly can play a large role in shaping a case’s outcome.109 This is certainly
government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a
minority must be imposed generally.”); Pamela S. Karlan, Let’s Call the Whole Thing Off: Can
States Abolish the Institution of Marriage?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 697, 701 (2010) (“The Equal
Protection Clause forces the majority to treat the minority the same way it treats itself.”).
102 Klarman, supra note 37, at 437.
103 See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Ry. Express, 336 U.S.
at 110.
104 See Karlan, supra note 83, at 477; Jean C. Love, The Synergistic Evolution of Liberty
and Equality in the Marriage Cases Brought by Same-Sex Couples in State Courts, 13 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 275, 276 (2010) (arguing that by focusing on liberty and equality simulta-
neously, gay rights litigators “have sparked a synergistic evolution of both liberty and equality”).
105 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (distinguishing Yoder as a hybrid case
about both free exercise and the right to direct the education of one’s children).
106 See generally Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH.
L. REV. 459 (2010).
107 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1, 8 (1972).
108 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326–27 (2003) (upholding challenged policy
despite application of strict scrutiny).
109 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 296 (1992) (“The key move in litigation under a two-tier
[scrutiny] system is steering the case onto the preferred track. The genius of this tracking device
is that outcomes can be determined at the threshold without the need for messy balancing.”).
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true in equal protection and due process cases, both of which frequently turn to the tiers
of scrutiny to organize their analysis.110 It is therefore especially striking that Lawrence,
a case about both liberty and equality, declined to identify a tier of scrutiny at all.111
Whereas the Court’s treatments of levels of generality and hybrid rights were
stealthy insofar as the Court did not adequately justify its determinations, its treatment
of the tiers of scrutiny was even stealthier, because it avoided acknowledging the issue
altogether. As a result, it is difficult to know whether Lawrence silently applied some
level of scrutiny or whether it rejected the tiers-of-scrutiny framework entirely.112 If
the Court did abandon the tiers, it is hard to know whether that move signals a broader
disavowal of the tiers or a case-specific determination. Alternatively, if Lawrence did
silently apply a tier of scrutiny, it does not tell us what tier to apply to similar infringe-
ments of liberty or other laws discriminating against homosexuals. As a result, it is
extremely difficult to know how to apply Lawrence to future cases.113
4. The Role of Public Opinion
Finally, Lawrence relied quite explicitly on changed public opinion to justify
striking down the Texas statute.114 As with its level-of-generality determination, this
determination was overt, but nevertheless stealthy insofar as it failed to theorize why
and how changing public opinion is relevant to constitutional interpretation. It fur-
ther failed to explain how public opinion should be measured. Complicating the analy-
sis still further, the Court also asserted that “Bowers was not correct when it was
decided,”115 thus undermining the relevance of the very cultural norms that the Court
purported to gauge.
Lawrence devoted considerable space to changes in public opinion. For example,
it explained that “[t]he 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct refer-
enced in the Bowers decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws
only against homosexual conduct.”116 It also added that “courts of five different States
have declined to follow it in interpreting provisions in their own state constitutions
parallel to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”117 In light of this
evidence, the Court concluded that public support for Bowers was lacking.118
110 See, e.g., id. at 295–96.
111 See Tribe, supra note 50, at 1916 (“One aspect of Lawrence that was bound to draw
criticism . . . is the absence of any explicit statement in the majority opinion about the standard
of review . . . .”).
112 Sunstein, supra note 35, at 48; see also Karlan, supra note 82, at 1450 (arguing that
Lawrence “undermines” the tiers of scrutiny).
113 See Sunstein, supra note 35, at 46 (explaining that much “opacity” in Lawrence stems
from the failure to identify a level of scrutiny); infra Part II.B.
114 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003).
115 Id. at 578.
116 Id. at 573.
117 See id. at 576 (citing state court cases).
118 Id. at 576–77.
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In many ways, Lawrence’s reliance on changing cultural norms is unremarkable.
Recent constitutional scholarship contends that the Court, far from being counter-
majoritarian, actually follows public opinion in many ways. Professor Barry Friedman’s
The Will of the People, for example, explains how cultural norms help shape Supreme
Court constitutional decisions,119 and other scholars similarly explore the compli-
cated interaction of popular will and constitutional meaning.120 This attention to public
opinion is understandable, both generally and specifically in cases like Lawrence. As
Professor Suzanne Goldberg has argued, courts must make factual judgments about
social groups, and those judgments will necessarily be shaped by changes in popular
judgments about those groups.121 Even if one believes that the judges should decide
cases by interpreting legal texts and precedents without reference to changing cultural
norms,122 the Court realizes that it bucks societal norms at its own peril.123 Lacking
its own enforcement power, the Supreme Court knows that it ought not stray too far
from mainstream public opinion lest its rulings go ignored and its institutional legiti-
macy erode.124
From this perspective, it seems reasonable for the Court to point to evidence of
changed social attitudes to help justify its decision in Lawrence.125 But though Law-
rence at least acknowledges the role of social change, it does very little to explain why
119 See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 367–68 (2009) (“Over time,
through a dialogue with the justices, the Constitution comes to reflect the considered judgment
of the American people regarding their most fundamental values.”).
120 See generally Klarman, supra note 37; Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial
Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113 (2012); Post, supra note 86; Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture,
Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF.
L. REV. 1323 (2006); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism
in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008).
121 See Goldberg, supra note 100, at 1961.
122 See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1104–05 (1975) (“Of course,
[the ideal judge’s] techniques may sometimes require a decision that opposes popular morality
on some issue. . . . Individuals have a right to the consistent enforcement of the principles
upon which their institutions rely. It is this institutional right, as defined by the community’s
constitutional morality, that [the ideal judge] must defend against any inconsistent opinion
however popular.”).
123 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 119, at 384 (“[R]eal change, when it comes, . . . stems
principally from attitudinal shifts in the population at large. Rare indeed is the legal victory—in
court or legislature—that is not a careful by-product of an emerging social consensus.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Justice O’Connor)).
124 See Lain, supra note 120, at 162–63.
125 The Court also regularly acknowledges the role of changing public opinion in Eighth
Amendment cases, where the constitutional prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment” is
understood to incorporate “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.” Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012). However, even within just this nar-
row class of cases, the Court’s measure and use of public opinion is inconsistent. See, e.g., Eric
Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment, Democratic Pedigree,
and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 14–18 (2010) (discussing the
Court’s inconsistent approaches to counting states as a measure of public opinion).
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and how those factors should help shape constitutional meaning. Given that one impor-
tant role of the Constitution is to check potentially tyrannical majorities,126 the Court’s
failure to justify its attention to majoritarian values is striking. Perhaps this attention is
primarily defensive, and the Court does not want to admit that it must worry about its
institutional legitimacy and the potential embarrassment that would ensue if the political
branches ignored its judgments.127 Perhaps the Court does not want to adopt a theory
of popular constitutionalism,128 thereby turning itself into a kind of polling station and
ceding its self-proclaimed hegemony over constitutional meaning.129 These may be
legitimate concerns, but the Court’s invocation of social attitudes without sufficient
explanation of their precise role in constitutional interpretation creates great uncer-
tainty about the relevance of such data in future cases.
The Court also does not adequately explain how it assesses public opinion. Indeed,
some of the data it relies on seems weak. For example, Lawrence explained that five
state courts no longer follow Bowers in interpreting their own state constitutional ana-
logs to the Due Process Clause.130 The views of five state courts seem beside the point;
even elected state judges hardly seem the best measure of public opinion. Moreover,
even if state judicial views were relevant, the fact that only five states rejected the rule
from Bowers, if anything, would seem to undermine the Court’s certainty that public
opinion had shifted so dramatically.
None of this is to say that Lawrence got the issue of public opinion wrong. To
the contrary, as explained above, it probably got it right.131 But if public opinion is
truly important to the Court’s analysis, it is strange that it did not offer more data and
explanation of the constitutional relevance of that data. By not engaging in careful
analysis of these figures, the Court raises large questions about how public opinion
will be determined and weighed in future cases in which popular norms are more
closely contested.132
126 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 406 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001) (arguing that the independence of courts is essential to prevent “momen-
tary inclination” that may lead majorities to favor policies “incompatible with the provisions
in the existing constitution”).
127 See supra notes 119–26 and accompanying text.
128 See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTION-
ALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism,
Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027 (2004).
129 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (“Congress may not legisla-
tively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.”).
130 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003).
131 See Goldberg, supra note 100, at 1984 (arguing that in light of significant shifts in
American attitudes towards homosexuality, judicial “norm declaration” in Lawrence was
“relatively safe”); Klarman, supra note 37, at 443; Sunstein, supra note 35, at 51–52; supra
Part I.A. But see Public Approval of Major Court Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/07/19/us/public-approval-of-major-court-decisions.html
(indicating that only 40% of respondents in 2003 poll agreed with Court’s decision in Lawrence).
132 See infra Part II.B.4.
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***
By relying on these stealth determinations, the Court avoided deciding Lawrence
on conventional doctrinal grounds. The Court did, of course, explicitly overrule
Bowers, but its substantive due process analysis was fuzzy. Bowers had held that
same-sex sodomy was not a fundamental right deeply rooted in our nation’s history
and therefore did not enjoy heightened constitutional protection.133 As explained
above, Lawrence did reject Bowers’s narrow framing of the right, but though various
doctrinal arguments could have justified its holding, the Court did not explicitly em-
brace any particular doctrinal path.134 For example, Lawrence could have identified
what right was at issue and then declared that right fundamental and deserving of strict
scrutiny. It did not follow this path. Lawrence also could have simply struck down the
Texas statute as irrational. Though the opinion may imply that conclusion, it did not ex-
plicitly follow that path either. Lawrence also could have explicitly rejected Bowers’s
concern with tradition in favor of the personal autonomy strain of substantive due
process instead.135 Though the Court appealed to such libertarian values,136 it did not
wrestle with how the autonomy-based and tradition-based threads of the doctrine
should interact with each other. This is not to contend that doctrine does not matter at
all, but it is to say that Lawrence rested its analysis more on undeveloped, sub-doctrinal
determinations than black-letter doctrine. The result is significant uncertainty about
its legal implications.
C. A Continuum of Stealth
It should be apparent by now that though the determinations identified here share
much in common, the Court’s resolution of the underlying issues are stealthy in some-
what different ways and to somewhat different degrees. The stealthiest determination
in Lawrence was probably the Court’s failure to identify a tier of scrutiny, because the
Court was altogether silent on the matter. The Court did announce other determinations
in Lawrence more explicitly but nevertheless proceeded stealthily in that it failed to
justify such determinations adequately or at all. The Court said that it was framing
the case at a broader level of generality than Bowers had used; that equality norms
were relevant to the library analysis; and that changed public opinion figured into its
reasoning. Nevertheless, it inadequately explained and justified each of these moves.137
133 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194–96 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539
U.S. 558.
134 See supra Part I.B.1.
135 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992).
136 See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Four Pillars of Constitutional Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO
L. REV. 969, 1000 (2011) (“Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion demonstrated that the Court’s
precedents carved out a sphere of liberty and autonomy in intimate personal choices that nec-
essarily encompasses the freedom to define one’s personal relationships, including the sexual
aspect of those relationships.”).
137 See supra Parts I.B.1, I.B.4, & I.B.5.
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Such opacity proffers assertions rather than explanations, as though the resolution of
the underlying determinations is more or less obvious.138 In all events, whether the
Court’s analysis is incomplete or absent, its self-assured tone masks deep constitu-
tional issues with which it fails to grapple.
II. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFUSION
A. Developments Since Lawrence
1. Legal and Cultural Changes
Because of these stealth determinations, Lawrence’s implications are very unclear.
Lawrence could prove to be a case with far-reaching or relatively minor doctrinal con-
sequences.139 The issue of same-sex marriage highlights this uncertainty.140 Lawrence
purported not to address the marriage question,141 but it was clearly an issue lurking
in the background.142
In the years since Lawrence, the legal regime pertaining to gay rights generally
and same-sex marriage specifically has changed dramatically. When the Court decided
Lawrence in 2003, no state permitted same-sex couples to marry. As of January 2013,
nine states and the District of Columbia do.143 Three of those states (New Hampshire,
Vermont, and New York) and the District of Columbia permit same-sex marriage by
statute.144 Voters in three other states (Maine, Maryland, and Washington) recently
adopted same-sex marriage in November 2012 ballot referenda.145 (Minnesota voters
during the same election rejected a proposal to amend the state constitution to define
138 Cf. Maroney, supra note 34, at 869–77 (discussing the Supreme Court’s use of “emotional
common sense” which is often confidently asserted but not always empirically accurate).
139 See Sunstein, supra note 35, at 60.
140 Lawrence’s impact is also unclear in other areas, including litigation challenging the
constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA. See infra Parts II.A.2 & III.A.
141 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (stating that the case “does not involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter”).
142 See id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion dismantles the structure of consti-
tutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual
unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”).
143 David Cole, Getting Nearer and Nearer, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 10, 2013, http://www
.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/jan/10/getting-nearer-and-nearer/?pagination=false.
144 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 46-401 (2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (2012); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2012).
145 See Molly Ball, The Marriage Plot: Inside This Year’s Epic Campaign for Gay
Equality, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 11, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/12/the
-marriage-plot-inside-this-years-epic-campaign-for-gay-equality/265865/#; Erik Eckholm,
As Victories Pile Up, Gay Rights Advocates Cheer ‘Milestone Year,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/same-sex-marriage-gains-cheer-gay-rights -advocates
.html.
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marriage as between one man and one woman.)146 State courts in the remaining three
states (Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Iowa) have held that the denial of marriage
rights for same-sex couples violates state constitutional provisions.147 Nine more states
that do not currently extend marriage to same-sex couples do offer those couples
separate legal statuses (usually “civil unions” or “domestic partnerships”) that ex-
tend to such couples many or all of the benefits and obligations of marriage.148 Rhode
Island does not yet grant same-sex marriages but recognizes such marriages created
in other states.149
This extraordinary growth of support for same-sex marriage will likely continue to
grow. Polls indicate that more than half of Americans today support same-sex marriage,
that young people are particularly supportive of same-sex marriage rights, and that
people typically do not become more conservative on this issue as they age.150 Indeed,
the statistician Nate Silver projects that by 2014, a majority of people in a majority of
states will support same-sex marriage, and that by 2016, only states in the Deep South
will still have majorities opposing it.151 In short, the rapid cultural transformation on this
issue in the decade since Lawrence has been so remarkable that Professor David Cole
has said that the gay rights movement “has achieved, more swiftly than any other indi-
vidual rights movement in history, not merely the impossible, but the unthinkable.”152
Still, while nationwide momentum clearly favors same-sex marriage in the long
run, the movement has also suffered defeats along the way, and the issue is still perco-
lating in legislatures, courts, and public discourse. As of fall 2012, thirty-one state con-
stitutional amendments explicitly banned the legal recognition of same-sex marriage.153
146 See Eckholm, supra note 145, at P7.
147 See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien,
763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
148 See Cole, supra note 143, at 27; Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Laws: State by State,
HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/same-sex-relationship-recognition
-laws-state-by-state (last visited Mar. 15, 2013) [hereinafter Recognition Laws].
149 See Recognition Laws, supra note 148.
150 See ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW RELIGION
DIVIDES AND UNITES US 127–28, 402–06 (2010) (summarizing several studies finding a “rapid,
massive reversal of attitudes toward gays” and adding that “[g]iven generational differences in
views toward gay marriage, acceptance of homosexual nuptials will likely keep growing”); Frank
Newport, For First Time, Majority of Americans Favor Legal Gay Marriage, GALLUP POL.
(May 20, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147662/first-time-majority-americans-favor-legal
-gay-marriage.aspx (noting that 53% of Americans support same-sex marriage and that support
is especially high among younger generations); Frank Newport, Half of Americans Support
Legal Gay Marriage, GALLUP POL. (May 8, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/154529/half
-americans-support-legal-gay-marriage.aspx; infra notes 267–69 and accompanying text.
151 See Cole, supra note 143, at 27. If anyone doubts the quality of Silver’s work, it is worth
remembering that he correctly projected the outcome of every state in the 2012 presidential
election. See id.
152 Id.
153 See Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same
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In three states (Hawaii, Alaska, and California), court-ordered gay marriage has been
overturned by referendum.154 When the Iowa Supreme Court held that a same-sex
marriage ban violated the state constitution, voters ousted three state Supreme Court
justices in the next election.155 Moreover, prior to the November 2012 elections, oppo-
nents of same-sex marriage had won 32 of 33 ballot measures.156 While the November
2012 elections signal a profound shift in societal attitudes, these earlier results demon-
strate that in at least some parts of the country, there remains significant opposition to
same-sex marriage.
2. Pending Cases
With several prominent cases pending, the legal landscape is likely to continue
to change quickly. As noted above, the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari
in Hollingsworth v. Perry, which challenges the constitutionality of Proposition 8,
the California ballot initiative that overturned the California Supreme Court’s ruling
that same-sex couples could not be denied the right to marry under the California
Constitution.157 A federal trial found Proposition 8 unconstitutional,158 and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed.159 The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning was narrow, relying primarily on
Romer to hold unconstitutional the revocation of marriage rights in a state that had once
offered such rights and still offers domestic partnership.160 Should the Supreme Court
choose to avoid the momentous substantive question of whether the U.S. Constitution
categorically forbids states from banning same-sex marriage, it could instead resolve
Perry on standing grounds or narrow substantive grounds dealing only with California’s
-sex-marriage-overview.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2013) (listing all thirty-one states that have
state law or constitutional provisions prohibiting same-sex marriage); North Carolina Passes
Same-Sex Marriage Ban, CNN Projects, CNN (May 11, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05
/08/politics/north-carolina-marriage/index.html (noting that North Carolina became the thirty-
first state to ban same-sex marriage).
154 Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 1375, 1384 (2010).
155 See Cole, supra note 143, at 27.
156 See Charles Mahtesian, The Map of Gay Marriage, POLITICO (May 4, 2012, 10:54 PM),
http://www.politico.com/blogs/charlie-mahtesian/2012/05/the-map-of-gay-marriage
-122535.html.
157 See Jay Strozdas, Trendlines: Court Decisions, Proposed Legislation, and Their Likely
Impact on Binational Same-Sex Families, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1339, 1364 (2011); supra
note 19.
158 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d. 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom.
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133
S. Ct. 786 (2012).
159 See Perry, 671 F.3d 1052, cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.
786 (2012).
160 See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1096 (“By using their initiative power to target a minority group
and withdraw a right that it possessed, without a legitimate reason for doing so, the People
of California violated the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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unique circumstances.161 Eventually, however, whether in Perry or elsewhere, the Court
is likely to address the larger question of whether the Constitution effectively requires
all states to extend marriage to same-sex couples.
In addition to Perry, the Supreme Court also granted certiorari in United States
v. Windsor, in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit struck down
Section 3 of DOMA, which denies federal economic and other benefits to lawfully
married same-sex couples and to surviving spouses from those marriages.162 DOMA,
of course, presents a different legal issue than Perry. Were the Court to affirm the
Second Circuit, its ruling would only require the federal government to recognize
same-sex marriages that were valid under state law; it would not require states to grant
same-sex marriage. Nevertheless, DOMA litigation obviously raises related questions
about legal regimes treating same-sex couples differently from opposite-sex couples.
To this extent, if the Court were to decide Windsor on the merits but dispose of Perry
on justiciability or narrow substantive grounds, its analysis of DOMA would likely be
very pertinent to a possible future same-sex marriage case.
B. Same-Sex Marriage Litigation and Stealth Constitutional Determinations
Though the demographic trends favor same-sex marriage in the long run,163 it
is far less clear that the Supreme Court, given the opportunity, would hold that the
Constitution requires all states to permit such marriages. There are certainly good
theoretical arguments for why Lawrence should lead to same-sex marriage. As the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explained in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health,164 once Lawrence removed moral disapproval as an acceptable justification
for laws discriminating against homosexuals, it became difficult to find another jus-
tification for treating gay and straight people differently for marriage or any other
purposes.165 Obviously, the tier of scrutiny might have a bearing on the analysis, but
if moral disapproval is not a permissible justification for a law, then laws prohibiting
same-sex marriage may be vulnerable even under rational basis review.166
161 See supra note 19.
162 Section 3 of DOMA reads:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
163 See supra notes 143–52 and accompanying text.
164 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
165 See id. 967–68 (finding that the marriage ban was insufficiently justified by the supposed
“community consensus that homosexual conduct is immoral”); Tribe, supra note 50, at 1946.
166 See Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 961 (finding the Massachusetts same-sex marriage ban
“does not survive rational basis review”); infra Part II.B.3.
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Nevertheless, as we shall see, Lawrence contains many points of analysis that
should be relevant to same-sex marriage litigation, yet the Court’s opacity in that case
obfuscates precisely how they might apply. To be clear, the point here is not that a
same-sex marriage case will turn on Lawrence.167 Other cases involving liberty,168
equality,169 marriage,170 association,171 and other issues may well figure more promi-
nently into the Court’s calculus.
Lawrence, however, provides an interesting lens through which to examine same-
sex marriage, not so much because of what it says but because of how little it says.
Lawrence ostensibly resolved many of the stealth determinations likely to arise again
in a marriage case. Lawrence’s importance to same-sex marriage, then, is less doctrinal
and more sub-doctrinal, insofar as it confronted (however unsatisfactorily) questions
regarding levels of generality, hybrid rights, tiers of scrutiny, and public opinion.
These issues are all relevant to same-sex marriage litigation, and yet Lawrence offers
minimal guidance for a Court now confronting similar inquiries again.172
1. Levels of Generality
As in Lawrence, same-sex marriage cases force courts to select between a broad
and a narrow level of generality.173 If broadly framed, “marriage” would encompass
both same-sex and opposite-sex couples. Under this formulation, same-sex couples
seeking marriage rights would probably win, because the Court has already said that
“marriage” constitutes a “fundamental right,” and fundamental rights typically trig-
ger heightened constitutional protection.174 If the Court, however, framed “marriage”
167 Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, The Gay and the Angry: The Supreme Court and the Battles
Surrounding Same-Sex Marriage, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 159, 164 (discussing recent cases with
potential implications for same-sex marriage, including Hollingsworth v. Perry, Doe v. Reed,
and Christian Legal Society v. Martinez).
168 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992).
169 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also United States v. Windsor,133
S. Ct. 786 (2012) (granting certiorari).
170 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
171 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (“Choices about marriage, family life, and
the upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court has ranked as ‘of basic
importance in our society.’” (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971))).
172 The following four subsections each deal with a separate determination that may well arise
in a same-sex marriage case. As with the discussion of Lawrence in Part I, many of these deter-
minations are interconnected, but this Article treats them separately for ease of presentation.
173 See supra Part I.B.1.
174 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 926–27 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (“[T]his Court also has held that the fundamental right of privacy protects citi-
zens against governmental intrusion in such intimate family matters as . . . marriage . . . .”);
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384 (“[T]he right ‘to marry, establish a home and bring up children’
is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause . . . .” (citations omitted));
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narrowly as extending only to one man and one woman, plaintiffs would face a steep,
uphill battle.
The choice here between construing the right at a broad level of generality—the
right to marry—and a narrow level of generality—the right of an unmarried person to
marry an unmarried person of the opposite sex—is in some ways reflective of the
Court’s choices in Bowers and Lawrence. Admittedly, the parallel is not exact. Whereas
Lawrence needed to decide the level of abstraction at which the asserted right would
be formulated, a same-sex marriage case presents a definitional question regarding what
constitutes marriage. Nevertheless, though conceptually distinct, both inquiries require
the Court to select the relevant level of generality, a determination that will significantly
affect the outcome of the case.
One possible way to decide upon a definition would be to turn to state codes, many
of which define marriage to apply only to opposite-sex couples.175 Relying on state
law to determine whether the fundamental right to “marriage” can extend to same-sex
couples may seem tautological, as it consults the very law that is being challenged to
determine the scope of the constitutional right. But state codes have traditionally de-
fined “marriage” and there is little else to guide the Court towards a definition, so it
is certainly conceivable that the Court would so frame the issue.176 Such an approach,
however, would seem to disrespect Lawrence’s preference for the broader level of
generality. If the Court were to select the narrow definition of marriage, it should at
least explain why it chose not to follow Lawrence’s broader level.177
An alternative approach would be to construe the right broadly, because Lawrence
did so and the cases are similar in important ways. Bans on sodomy and same-sex mar-
riage both discriminate against and stigmatize homosexuals, indicating that society does
not value their life choices.178 Both legal regimes similarly interfere with a person’s
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our
very existence and survival.” (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942))).
175 See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185–86 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 810 (1972) (construing the marriage statute to apply only to opposite-sex marriages);
Legal Definitions of Marriage in the United States, CENTER FOR LESBIAN & GAY STUD.
RELIGION & MINISTRY, http://www.clgs.org/marriage/state-definitions (last visited Mar. 15,
2013) (listing states with state laws or constitutional amendments limiting marriage to one
man and one woman).
176 See Chad Muir, Note, Perry v. Schwarzenegger: A Judicial Attack on Traditional
Marriage, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 159 (2011) (noting that the definition of marriage
“has always been entrusted to the people acting through state governments” (quoting Brief for
States of Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 2, Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-2292VRW))); Lynn D. Wardle, The Judicial
Imposition of Same-Sex Marriage: The Boundaries of Judicial Legitimacy and Legitimate
Redefinition of Marriage, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 79, 99 (2010) (“Undeniably, the Constitution was
intended to preserve the regulation of family law for state, not national, regulation.”).
177 See supra Part I.B.1.
178 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (“When homosexual conduct is made
criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject
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most personal life choices regarding their sexual and life partners.179 From this per-
spective, it seems sensible for the Court simply to follow Lawrence’s lead.
However, there are also important differences that complicate the picture. Most
obviously, as mentioned above, the level of generality at which a liberty interest is
construed is not entirely akin to how an existing institution is defined. Even assuming,
however, that the inquiries are similar enough to render Lawrence relevant, that case
did not indicate that the Court should always select the broader level of generality in
an individual rights case. Instead, Lawrence specifically faulted Bowers for not recog-
nizing the statute’s deep harmful effects.180 It is unclear, though, that marriage bans’ ef-
fects are always as pernicious and far reaching as anti-sodomy laws’ effects. As Justice
O’Connor explained in Lawrence, Texas’s law branded homosexuals as presumptive
criminals,181 affecting their employment and housing options, as well as their ability to
adopt children (or even raise their own).182 Had the Court upheld the petitioners’ con-
victions, some jurisdictions would even require them to register as sex offenders.183
These are exceedingly harsh penalties.184
By contrast, while the denial of marriage can also carry serious legal consequences,
the scope of those consequences depends on the jurisdiction. Marriage bans can deny
members of same-sex couples various entitlements under both state and federal law,
including hospital visitation rights, tax benefits, immigration visas, access to health
insurance, pension benefits, inheritance rights, and more.185 (If the Court invalidates
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”); WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 161 (1996); Francisco Valdes, Testing
Democracy: Marriage Equality, Citizen-Lawmaking and Constitutional Structure, 19 S. CAL.
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 3, 33 (2010) (“[Proposition 8] aims, in short, to stigmatize a minority
through the use of law to create differentiation—to reinforce an invidious construction of
‘difference’ within a purportedly democratic society committed to equality.”). See generally
Marc R. Poirier, Name Calling: Identifying Stigma in the “Civil Union”/“Marriage” Distinction,
41 CONN. L. REV. 1425 (2009) (discussing how even withholding the term “marriage” in place
of the term “civil union” stigmatizes homosexuals).
179 See Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, Essay, The Constitutional Inevitability of Same-
Sex Marriage, 71 MD. L. REV. 471, 489 (2012) (“[I]f our Constitution’s promises of liberty,
equality, and dignity are to be realized for the millions of Americans whose most intimate lives
are degraded by laws that set their love, their enduring commitments to one another, and their
very sense of personhood apart as little more than second-class, then in the end the Justices must
do their duty and recognize same-sex marriage rights.”).
180 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
181 See id. at 584 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
182 See id. at 581–82.
183 See id. at 581.
184 Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (“[A] prison
sentence for [sodomy]—certainly a sentence of long duration—would create a serious Eighth
Amendment issue.”).
185 See Varnum v. Brien 763 N.W. 2d 862, 873 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955–56 (Mass. 2003); Barbara A. Robb, Note, The Constitutionality
of the Defense of Marriage Act in the Wake of Romer v. Evans, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 263,
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DOMA in Windsor, as seems likely, legally married same-sex couples will enjoy the
federal benefits accruing to married opposite-sex couples.)186 The denial of marriage
rights can also injure a same-sex couple’s children, who “reap a measure of family
stability and economic security” when their parental figures are able to and do marry
each other.187 The denial of marriage benefits, then, results in serious deprivations. Per-
haps they are not quite as offensive and damaging as Texas’s criminal law was, but the
legal consequences of the two regimes are arguably similar enough to justify a broad
framing in a marriage case under a Lawrence analysis.
However, not all states prohibiting gay marriage deny committed same-sex couples
these benefits. For example, California, even after Proposition 8, offers all the atten-
dant benefits of marriage under state law, so that same-sex couples entering domestic
partnerships enjoy the same benefits and obligations of marriage enjoyed by married
opposite-sex couples in California.188 Several other states offer similar benefits.189 In
these states, same-sex couples are denied primarily the right to call their commitment
“marriage.”190 As those couples have forcefully (and, in Perry, thus far, successfully)
argued,191 the denial of the “marriage” label causes real injury by treating the members
of those couples as second-class citizens. The stigmatic effects of this label should not
be underestimated.192 Nevertheless, in states offering same-sex couples all or most of
the tangible benefits of marriage, it is harder to analogize the hardships suffered by
those couples to the far-reaching harm imposed by anti-sodomy laws. To the extent
Lawrence indicated that a broad level of generality was appropriate because of those
far-reaching consequences,193 a same-sex marriage ban in a state offering same-sex
300 (1997) (“By stating that the federal government will not recognize marriages of same-sex
couples, DOMA denies a vast number of federal benefits and entitlements to married same-
sex couples.”(footnote omitted)); An Overview of Federal Rights and Protections Granted
to Married Couples, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/an-overview
-of-federal-rights-and-protections-granted-to-married-couples (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
186 See supra Part II.A.2.
187 Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 956–57.
188 See Recognition Laws, supra note 148.
189 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
190 See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Gay Marriage, THE BECKER-POSNER
BLOG (July 17, 2005, 7:19 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2005/07/the-law-and
-economics-of-gay-marriage%C3%A4%C3%AEposner.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2013) (“The
most remarkable aspect of the current controversy is that it is mainly about a word, ‘marriage.’”).
191 See supra notes 18–21, 160 and accompanying text.
192 See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1093 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012); Daniel Dunson, A Right to a Word? The Inter-
play of Equal Protection and Freedom of Thought in the Move to Gender-Blind Marriage,
5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 552 (2012) (discussing the social implications of the word “marriage”).
193 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“[The] penalties and purposes [of the
laws at issue] have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”).
794 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 21:765
couples all the benefits of marriage might not require an analogously broad level of
generality. Of course, this reasoning is contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s Perry ruling,
which indicated that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional partially because it could not
serve legitimate state interests given that “it changes the law far too little to have any
of the effects it purportedly was intended to yield.”194 One could turn this argument on
its head, however, and contend that the existence of civil unions or domestic partner-
ships substantially (though not entirely) mitigates the far-reaching harm flowing from
a same-sex marriage ban.
Further complicating the matter is the fact that framing the right to marry at too
broad a level of generality would be absurd. Most Americans believe the right to marry
only permits one unmarried adult to marry another unmarried adult. “People do not
have a right to marry their dog, their house, their refrigerator, July 21, or a rose petal.”195
Nor do they enjoy the right to marry a seven-year-old or eleven people at once.
This is all obvious enough, but it complicates selecting a broad level of generality,
because we must determine a principled way to select a framing that is broad enough
to encompass same-sex couples, but not too broad.196 Opponents of same-sex marriage
use this wrinkle to press the absurdity of extending marriage beyond “one man, one
woman.” This objection to same-sex marriage is hardly convincing, especially because
it ignores extensive psychological research concluding that same-sex couples resemble,
in most important respects, opposite-sex couples.197 Other formulations of marriage (to
194 Perry, 671 F.3d at 1095. For example, Proposition 8 did not modify state laws granting
same-sex couples the right to form and raise a family, thus undermining the contention that
the proposition advances an interest in responsible child-rearing. See id. at 1086.
195 Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2083 (2005).
196 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225–74 (1986) (comparing constitutional
and common law interpretation to writing a chain novel in which the judge “knows that other
judges have decided cases that, although not exactly like his case, deal with related problems;
he must think of their decisions as part of a long story he must interpret and then continue,
according to his own judgment of how to make the developing story as good as it can be”).
197 See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 874 (Iowa 2009) (“There is no scientific
evidence that parenting effectiveness is related to parental sexual orientation: Lesbian and gay
parents are as likely as heterosexual parents to provide supportive and healthy environments for
children.” (quoting Am. Psychological Ass’n Council of Representatives, Am. Psychological
Ass’n, Resolution on Sexual Orientation, Parents, and Children (2004), in Ruth Ullmann
Paige, Proceedings of American Psychological Association for Legislative Year 2004: Minutes
of the Council of Representatives July 28 & 30, 2004 Honolulu, HI, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
436–511 (July–August 2005))); Brief Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 14–17, Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. Ct. App. 2006) (“Hetero-
sexual and same-sex couples alike face similar challenges concerning issues such as inti-
macy, love, equity, loyalty, and stability, and they go through similar processes to address those
challenges.”); Lawrence A. Kurdek, Are Gay and Lesbian Cohabiting Couples Really Different
from Heterosexual Married Couples?, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 880 (2004); see also Lawrence
A. Kurdek, Differences Between Heterosexual-Nonparent Couples and Gay, Lesbian, and
Heterosexual-Parent Couples, 22 J. FAM. ISSUES 727 (2001); Richard A. Mackey et al.,
Psychological Intimacy in the Lasting Relationships of Heterosexual and Same-Gender
Couples, 43 SEX ROLES 201 (2000). See generally Letitia Anne Peplau & Leah R. Spalding,
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eleven people, a cat, my house, a seven-year-old, or July 21) do not share that impor-
tant similarity. Nevertheless, if one accepts that the right should not be framed at either
its broadest or narrowest level of abstraction, it is not easy to devise neutral principles
for selecting a level of generality somewhere in between. As a result, courts sometimes
select the level of generality without any justification more than a tautology.198
2. Doctrinal Categorization and Hybrid Constitutional Rights
Like Lawrence, a same-sex marriage case implicates both liberty and equality
concerns, and much will turn on how the Court characterizes and categorizes the
asserted injury. On the equal protection front, plaintiffs have at least three separate
plausible arguments. Plaintiffs can argue that prohibitions on same-sex marriage dis-
criminate on the basis of sexuality, thus denying homosexuals the equal protection of
the laws. They can also argue that such prohibitions discriminate on the basis of sex,
because the laws prohibit a man from marrying another man (though he could marry
a woman). Finally, they can argue that such prohibitions deny equal protection in the
context of the fundamental right to marry—that is, through the fundamental rights
strand of the equal protection doctrine.199 On the substantive due process front, they can
argue that denying homosexuals the right to marry the person of their choice deprives
them of the fundamental right to marriage200 and further interferes with their rights to
define their family and raise their children how they see fit.201
Each of these approaches is a plausible, non-frivolous attack on laws prohibiting
same-sex marriage, but each also faces substantial doctrinal obstacles. An equal protec-
tion claim based on sexual orientation, for example, faces a tier-of-scrutiny problem.
Though Romer did not foreclose heightened scrutiny, it applied only rational basis
review, albeit, most commentators agree, rational basis with bite.202 While it may be
The Close Relationships of Lesbians, Gay Men and Bisexuals, in CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS 111,
114 (Clyde Hendrick & Susan S. Hendrick eds., 2000).
198 See Jackson v. Abercrombie, No. 11-00734, 2012 WL 3255201, at *25 (D. Haw. Aug. 8,
2012) (contrasting Loving, which considered “the long recognized right to marry,” with a case
presenting “a different right, the right to marry someone of the same sex”).
199 See Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 154, at 1377 (“[I]n the same-sex marriage context,
courts and commentators have failed to appreciate the extent to which fundamental interest
claims under the Equal Protection Clause require separate analysis.”).
200 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
201 See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (holding that a city may
not cut “off any protection of family rights at the first convenient, if arbitrary boundary—the
boundary of the nuclear family”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)
(holding unconstitutional a state law requiring children to attend public schools); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (finding a statute prohibiting teaching of foreign languages
in schools violated the right of parents to make decisions for their children).
202 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 807 (noting that the Supreme Court has not yet ruled
as to whether discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation triggers heightened scrutiny);
supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
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possible to invalidate a same-sex marriage ban as irrational,203 that more deferential
level of scrutiny would obviously make the plaintiffs’ job more difficult.204
Plaintiffs, of course, can argue that classifications on the basis of sexuality deserve
heightened scrutiny. Under constitutional doctrine, courts considering whether a group
should be considered a suspect class look to whether the group has endured a history
of invidious discrimination;205 whether the characteristics distinguishing the group
actually implicate the group members’ ability to contribute to society;206 whether the
distinguishing characteristic is “immutable” beyond the class members’ control,207 or
highly resistant to change;208 and the political power of the suspect class.209 Homosex-
ual plaintiffs would certainly satisfy the first two inquiries and, though there is some
lingering scientific debate, probably the third as well.210 In some states, they may also
have a good argument that they should satisfy the fourth, though homosexuals’ relative
“political power” may depend on what political sphere a judge considers relevant.211
203 See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (“[W]e
conclude that the marriage ban does not meet the rational basis test for either due process or
equal protection.”).
204 See Klarman, supra note 37, at 437 (noting that invalidating laws under “rationality
review is difficult to justify, given the extreme deference the Court has traditionally shown
when applying that standard”).
205 See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (“Close relatives are not a ‘suspect’
or ‘quasi-suspect’ class. As a historical matter, they have not been subjected to discrimi-
nation . . . .”); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682–84 (1973) (discussing this nation’s
“long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination” and concluding that on this basis, “[t]here
can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination”).
206 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (“While the treatment of the
aged in this Nation has not been wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those
who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin, have not experienced
a ‘history of purposeful unequal treatment’ or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis
of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.” (emphasis added)).
207 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223–24 (1982) (“In determining the rationality of [the
statute], we may appropriately take into account its costs to the Nation and to the innocent chil-
dren who are its victims.”); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (“Moreover, since sex, like race and
national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the
imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would
seem to violate ‘the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relation-
ship to individual responsibility . . . .’” (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406
U.S. 164, 175 (1972))).
208 See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 893 (Iowa 2009).
209 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985) (“[T]he legisla-
tive response, which could hardly have occurred and survived without public support, negates
any claim that the mentally retarded are politically powerless in the sense that they have no
ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers.”).
210 See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 893 (acknowledging controversy but concluding that in
all events sexual orientation is “highly resistant to change”).
211 See Yoshino, supra note 81, at 762 n.104 (“In grappling with the challenge of how to
define political powerlessness, the Justices have cycled among various tests that have led to
inconsistent results.”).
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The Court has not sufficiently clarified how these separate inquiries interact,212 but
homosexuals probably satisfy enough of them so that the Court should find they consti-
tute a suspect class.213 Such an approach would trigger heightened scrutiny and almost
certainly invalidate the marriage ban.
Nevertheless, as Professor Kenji Yoshino has argued, attempts to convince courts
to label a group “suspect” “have an increasingly antiquated air in federal constitutional
litigation.”214 Indeed, the Supreme Court has not accorded heightened scrutiny to a
new classification since 1977, when it did so on the basis of non-marital parentage.215
Moreover, while some state courts have determined that sexual orientation classifica-
tions are presumptively suspect,216 more have afforded rational basis review to such
classifications.217 It is therefore far from clear that the Court would hold that sexual
orientation classifications trigger heightened scrutiny.
An equal protection claim based on sex discrimination poses a separate kind of
problem. Sex discrimination triggers at least intermediate scrutiny,218 and perhaps even
something higher.219 To this extent, an equal protection claim charging sex discrimina-
tion, rather than sexual orientation discrimination, would seem to have a better chance
of success.220 However, while important, the tier of scrutiny is not everything, and, here
the argument seems to mischaracterize the real nature of the plaintiffs’ grievance.
It is true that same-sex marriage bans treat people differently on account of their sex,
insofar as they prevent, say, a woman from marrying the person of her choice if that
person is a woman—but not if that person is a man. However, in other senses, marriage
bans do not seem to fit within the conventional sex-discrimination paradigm. For one,
they apply equally to men and women; gay men are no more entitled to marry their
212 See id.
213 See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180–85 (2d. Cir. 2012) (finding that
homosexuals as a group satisfied each of the four inquiries), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012).
214 Yoshino, supra note 81, at 757.
215 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766–76 (1977).
216 See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008); Varnum
v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906–07 (Iowa 2009).
217 See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2003); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Conaway v. Deane,
932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King
County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006); see also Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9–11 (1st. Cir. 2012) (invalidating Section 3 of DOMA under rational
basis review).
218 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[C]lassifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives.” (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971))).
219 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (holding that the Virginia
Military Institute failed to show an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for its policy of
excluding women).
220 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian
and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519, 535 (2001) (explaining the
“analytic strength” of the sex discrimination argument).
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same-sex partners than lesbians are. Furthermore, same-sex marriage bans do not treat
either men or women as second-class citizens on account of their sex. These laws penal-
ize and stigmatize homosexuals of both sexes.221 To this extent, while a sex discrimina-
tion claim is not frivolous, it seems to miss the essence of the harm.222 Unsurprisingly,
then, courts have been generally unreceptive to this line of argument.223
Another doctrinal argument in favor of same-sex marriage is via the fundamental-
rights branch of equal protection law. Professors Nelson Tebbe and Deborah Widiss
have highlighted this argument, arguing that once conferred, “the right to marry in a
legally recognized ceremony is fundamental: if a government decides to recognize and
support civil marriage, it cannot exclude same-sex couples without providing an ade-
quate justification.”224 Once again, though, there are obstacles. Most obviously, the
argument depends on a broad definition of marriage. If the Court selects a definition
of marriage limiting the institution to one man and one woman, this argument loses
its traction, because no fundamental right will have been denied.225 Additionally, the
fundamental-rights branch of the Equal Protection Clause is narrow, focusing almost
221 See Caroline J. Lindberg, Lisa Grant v. South-West Trains: The Limited Utility of Sex
Discrimination Arguments in Securing Lesbian and Gay Rights, 12 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J.
403, 421 n.137 (1998) (describing this as an “equality in misery” argument); Paul Benjamin
Linton, Same-Sex “Marriage” Under State Equal Rights Amendments, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
909, 951–52 (2002) (“Men and women enjoy equal rights with respect to the right of marriage.
Both men and women may marry a member of the opposite sex; neither may marry a member
of the same sex.”). But see Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 906 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J.,
concurring) (“Dr. A and Dr. B both want to marry Ms. C, an X-ray technician. Dr. A may do
so because Dr. A is a man. Dr. B may not because Dr. B is a woman. Dr. A and Dr. B are
people of opposite sexes who are similarly situated in the sense that they both want to marry
a person of their choice. The statute disqualifies Dr. B from marriage solely on the basis of
her sex . . . . This is sex discrimination.”).
222 Cf. Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264 (3rd Cir. 2001) (holding
that a male homosexual employee who claimed that he was discriminated against because of
his sexual orientation did not establish that he was discriminated against because of his sex, as
required to prove sexual harassment claim under Title VII); Swift v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 483, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that employer’s alleged comments
about employee’s sexual orientation did not constitute discrimination based on gender).
223 See Clifford J. Rosky, Perry v. Schwarzenegger and the Future of Same-Sex Marriage
Law, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 913, 927 (2011) (“When courts have rejected the sex discrimination
argument—instead of avoiding it—they have typically followed the dissent’s argument in
Baehr, reasoning that laws against same-sex marriage do not discriminate based on sex because
they apply equally to both sexes.”); Deborah A. Widiss et al., Exposing Sex Stereotypes in
Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 461, 462 (2007) (“[N]o
state high court since Baehr has found that denying a same-sex couple the right to marry suc-
cessfully states a sex discrimination claim. Rather, the subsequent decisions have either ignored
or rejected sex discrimination arguments.”). But see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw.
1993) (treating Hawaii’s marriage statute as a sex-based classification subject to heightened
scrutiny under the state constitution’s equal protection provision).
224 Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 154, at 1380.
225 See supra Part II.B.1.
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exclusively on the right to vote and the right to access judicial process.226 While it may
be true that the right to marriage shares similarities to these other rights,227 the Court
may be unlikely to broaden this doctrine, especially over something as controversial as
same-sex marriage.228 Indeed, there are important differences between the right to mar-
riage, on the one hand, and the rights to vote and access judicial process, on the other.
Whereas voting and access to courts are essential to our democracy, marriage, however
important to society, is not part of our governmental structure. It is therefore hardly
certain that this argument would be successful under current constitutional doctrine.
Finally, a substantive due process argument also has doctrinal weaknesses. First,
as noted above, much substantive due process doctrine roots fundamental rights in the
nation’s tradition.229 While plaintiffs will seek to define marriage broadly, the doctrine’s
interest in historical practice may well militate for a traditionally narrow view of mar-
riage, limited to one man and one woman.230 Tethering rights so closely to historical
practices necessarily disadvantages plaintiffs seeking the recognition of new rights.
Of course, as Lawrence and other cases like Roe v. Wade231 have demonstrated, the
Court does not rigidly adhere to tradition in all substantive due process cases. Never-
theless, because Lawrence provided no guidance on when it is appropriate to ignore
that framework, one can only guess whether it would apply in a same-sex marriage
case. Second, the constitutional right to marriage itself flows from the obsolete view
that marriage is the only lawful means for realizing other constitutionally protected
liberty interests in procreation and sexual intimacy.232 Given that procreation and sexual
intimacy commonly occur today outside of marriage, the need to constitutionalize the
right to marry has lost some urgency. Third, marriage in many ways seems less about
liberty than about accessing government created benefits and publicly announcing
mutual commitment.233 Same-sex marriage bans undoubtedly injure same-sex couples
who wish to marry, but it is not entirely clear that it is those individuals’ liberty that
is invaded. After all, those couples can still live together and do most of the things that
married couples do. Indeed, in states granting all the attendant benefits of marriage,
226 See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 654 (17th
ed. 2010) (“[T]he Court has developed this line of cases in only a very few areas.”).
227 See Tebbe & Widdis, supra note 154, at 1414 (“Civil marriage, like voting and criminal
appeals, is a discretionary government program that nevertheless carries enormous social and
legal importance and that likewise sits at a nexus of equality and liberty concerns.”).
228 See Sunstein, supra note 195, at 2097 (noting that whereas equality is inherent in the right
to vote itself, the same is probably not true of the right to marry).
229 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (“Our Nation’s history, legal
traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial ‘guideposts for responsible decisionmaking,’
that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause.” (citation omitted) (quoting
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992))).
230 See supra Part I.B.1.
231 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
232 Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 154, at 1395.
233 Id.
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the primary deprivation appears to be the symbolic status of marriage and in that re-
gard may be conceived of as expressive.234 This deprivation is an injury, no doubt, but
it is not clear that it is one sounding in liberty.235
Lawyers will likely press several or all of these doctrinal options, but the Court
nevertheless will enjoy substantial leeway to address the questions it chooses in the
manner it wishes.236 One approach would simply be to reject each doctrinal argument
and hold that there is no right to same-sex marriage. Such an approach, however,
would fail to recognize the hybrid analysis Lawrence invites and the ways in which
the liberty, equality, and even possibly free speech norms complement each other in
this setting.237 To this extent, a more synergistic approach combining constitutional
rights seems more appropriate and respectful of Lawrence’s “stereoscopic” spirit.238
Lawrence itself, however, provides inadequate guidance on when and how to engage
in such hybrid analyses. To this extent, Lawrence suggests a potential path for plain-
tiffs in these cases but does little to illuminate that path.
3. Tiers of Scrutiny
After Lawrence, it is also unclear whether the tiers-of-scrutiny analysis that has
been the center of many equal protection and substantive due process cases applies at
all. As noted above, Lawrence might be read as doing away with the tiers of scrutiny
altogether, or silently applying heightened scrutiny, or even rejecting the Texas stat-
ute as irrational.239 Lawrence’s silence on these matters, of course, further complicates
same-sex marriage litigation, in which the tier of scrutiny (if applied) may go a long
way to determining the outcome of the case.
Even if the Court settles on a tier of scrutiny, it would then have to decide how to
apply it. The tiers, in practice, function more like a spectrum than discrete categories,240
234 It is unlikely that the Court would evaluate same-sex marriage bans under free speech
doctrine, but in states granting civil unions but not marriage to same-sex couples, the state may
be thought of as providing an expressive forum for opposite-sex couples, but not same-sex
couples, to announce their mutual commitment.
235 See Cass R. Sunstein, Liberty After Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059, 1074 (2004) (“If
certain people are told that they cannot marry, the real objection lies not in due process, but in
a possible violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
236 See Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related
Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 683–711 (2012) (discussing the Court’s “agenda-setting
freedom”).
237 See supra note 82–87 and accompanying text.
238 See Karlan, supra note 83, at 474. In striking down DOMA, the First Circuit offered a
different sort of hybrid analysis, noting that federalism concerns “somewhat” diminished the
deference ordinarily accorded Congress, even though neither the Tenth Amendment nor Spend-
ing Clause arguments independently invalidated the law. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2012).
239 See supra Part I.B.3.
240 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]his Court . . . has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination
allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause.”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 689
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so each tier can operate with varying degrees of rigor. Rational basis review, for in-
stance, can be extremely deferential, as when economic regulations are reviewed,241
or applied with considerable bite, as in Romer where the Court perceived that the
challenged amendment had the effect of penalizing an unpopular group.242 These dif-
ferent variants of rational basis can produce different outcomes. In Goodridge, for
instance, both the majority and dissent agreed that rational basis review was appro-
priate, but they disagreed on how it should be applied.243 The majority emphasized
that “rational basis analysis requires that statutes bear[ ] a real and substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals, or some other phase of the general welfare.”244
Thus, “[n]ot every asserted rational relationship is a conceivable one, and rationality
review is not toothless.”245 Having found that rational basis review has some real bite,
the court continued to find that the same-sex marriage ban did not meet rational basis
review. By contrast, the dissent argued that the issue is whether the state “satisfies a
minimal threshold of rationality,” a seemingly more deferential level it found had been
satisfied.246 These variations are hardly confined to rational basis review; intermediate
and strict scrutiny, too, sometimes have varying degrees of rigor.247
These different approaches to all the tiers of scrutiny further complicate same-sex
marriage litigation. It is hard to predict, for instance, how a court applying rational
basis review would determine whether the legislature is entitled to believe rationally
that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples furthers the well-being of children. The
argument appears weak. Children being raised by same-sex couples would benefit
from their parental figures’ marriage to each other, especially in states that do not al-
ready extend to same-sex couples marriage’s attendant benefits. Even in states already
extending such benefits, marriage recognition would help children by removing the
stigma of non-recognition currently hanging over their parents’ relationship. Moreover,
psychological research concludes that there is no scientific basis for concluding that
gay and lesbian parents are any less capable than heterosexual parents or that their
(summarizing critics contending that “although the Court speaks in terms of three tiers of
review, in reality there is a spectrum of standards of review”).
241 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
242 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985); Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35
(1973); supra note 101 and accompanying text.
243 Compare Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 960 (Mass. 2003), with
id. at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
244 Id. at 960 (majority opinion) (quoting Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 204
N.E.2d 281 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
245 Id. at 960 n.20 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Murphy v. Comm’r of the
Dep’t of Indus. Accidents, 612 N.E.2d 1149 (1993)).
246 Id. at 978–82 (Sosman, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1003 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
247 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 350 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(accusing the majority of watering down strict scrutiny); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 571–72 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of increasing the rigor of
intermediate scrutiny).
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children are any less psychologically healthy or well adjusted.248 Under rational basis
review with any degree of bite, then, a court should reject the argument that children
benefit if marriage is limited to opposite-sex couples. If rational basis review, how-
ever, is reduced to its most deferential variant, some judges may find it difficult to say
that it is irrational for the legislature to believe that opposite-sex couples provide the
optimal setting for child-rearing, especially given that psychological research in this
area is still ongoing.249
Moreover, defenders of same-sex marriage bans might try to defend such laws in
more general terms. One such contention might be that it is rational for the state to pre-
serve the traditional understanding of marriage during a period of rapid social change.250
Another such argument, particularly relevant in a case like Perry involving a voter
referendum displacing a court decision, may be that measures like Proposition 8 are
rational as a means to express opposition to judicial interference with democratically
enacted laws.251 Neither of these arguments grapple directly with why same-sex mar-
riage bans harm some individuals, but under an especially deferential form of rational
basis review, either may be sufficient to persuade some Justices to uphold a marriage
ban like Proposition 8.
Of course, given that same-sex marriage bans penalize an unpopular group, the
Court should, at a minimum, apply heightened rational basis review of the sort used
in Romer, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,252 and U.S. Department
of Agriculture v. Moreno.253 But though other courts construing Supreme Court pre-
cedent have been able to tease out a general approach for when heightened rational
basis review is appropriate,254 the Court itself has never committed to a clear formula,
leaving considerable uncertainty in its wake. Indeed, just as Lawrence failed to iden-
tify a tier of scrutiny at all, so too have other cases insufficiently offered guidance for
which variant of scrutiny to apply within a selected tier.
Clearly, the Court has felt that it needs some flexibility in using these tiers to
arrive at sensible outcomes, at the expense of developing a systematic approach.255
248 See Brief Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees at 32–44, Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. Ct. App. 2006) (summarizing
extensive psychological research); see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 964 (“It cannot be
rational under our laws . . . to penalize children by depriving them of State benefits because
the State disapproves of their parents’ sexual orientation.”).
249 See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 998–1002 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
250 See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners at 48–55, Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144 (U.S. filed
Jan. 23, 2013).
251 See, e.g., id. at 55–61.
252 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
253 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
254 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 10–11
(1st Cir. 2012) (noting in a DOMA case that Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer all “stressed the
historic patterns of disadvantage suffered by the group adversely affected by the statute” and
consequently applied heightened rational basis review).
255 See Berger, supra note 9, at 481–82.
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The tiers of scrutiny ostensibly function as black-letter doctrine, recited in case law
and treatises, but in practice, the factors governing their application are murky. As the
Second Circuit noted recently, “[t]he Supreme Court has not expressly sanctioned such
modulation” within the tiers of scrutiny, thus resulting in “some doctrinal instability in
this area.”256 To this extent, the stealth, once again, highlights the Court’s discomfort
with its own doctrine. Lawrence is hardly anomalous in this regard, though by failing
to identify a level of scrutiny at all, it approached these questions with an even greater
degree of stealth than usual.
4. The Role of Public Opinion
The Court’s methodology for discerning public opinion and its use of that opinion
may be one of the most important factors in a same-sex marriage case. Five or more
Justices may very well believe that there is no legitimate reason for denying same-sex
couples the right to marry, and they may well further believe that that denial seriously
harms those couples, their children, and homosexuals more generally. But if those
Justices also perceive that they are too far ahead of public opinion, they may decline
to invalidate state marriage bans. Even Justice Ginsburg, who worked on women’s
legal issues for the ACLU earlier in her career,257 has said that Roe v. Wade, in light
of the fierce, decades-long backlash it provoked,258 “ventured too far in the change it
ordered.”259 Some Justices sympathetic to same-sex marriage as a policy matter, then,
may still worry about provoking a substantial backlash that undermines the Court’s
institutional legitimacy.260 Even if such Justices would not vote to uphold a same-sex
marriage ban, they may try to dispose of the case without reaching the merits.261
256 Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180–81 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct.
786 (2012).
257 Tribute: The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES
UNION (Mar. 7, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/tribute-legacy-ruth-bader-ginsburg
-and-wrp-staff.
258 See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegl, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 388–402 (2007) (summarizing scholarship about
backlash to constitutional decisions); cf. Eskridge, supra note 59, at 1294; Michael J. Klarman,
How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994).
259 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Essay, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation
to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 376 (1985).
260 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH,
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 48–155 (2013) (detailing several instances of
societal backlash against state court rulings in favor of same-sex marriage); Jane S. Schacter,
Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1183–97 (2009) (discussing backlash after court decisions requiring same-
sex marriage).
261 The Court may have been animated by these concerns in Perry when it asked the parties
to brief whether Proposition 8’s supporters had standing in the case. See Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012).
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A great deal therefore turns on how the Court perceives and weighs public opinion
on this issue.262 Though these issues were explicit in Lawrence,263 that case still left
unclear both how the Court should measure cultural norms and what weight to give
those norms in its decisionmaking. The Court, as discussed above, referenced state
statutory regimes, noting that by 2003 only four states had laws singling out homo-
sexual sodomy for criminal penalty.264 If state counting were the primary measure of
public opinion on same-sex marriage, the plaintiffs would likely lose. Fewer than ten
states currently extend marriage to same-sex couples.265 Whereas a significant majority
of states had repealed anti-sodomy laws by 2003, most states today still prohibit same-
sex marriage. Indeed, as of January 2013, thirty-seven states had statutory or constitu-
tional provisions limiting marriage to one man and one woman.266
State counting, however, is but one measure of public opinion, and Lawrence does
not indicate that it is exclusive or even primary. Public opinion polls arguably provide
a better indication of public views on contentious issues, and, viewed through this
lens, same-sex marriage enjoys far greater support.267 According to recent polling data,
slightly over half of Americans today support same-sex marriage.268 The trend, further-
more, is clearly in favor of same-sex marriage; in just the last half-dozen years, support
for gay marriage has risen substantially.269 Moreover, 70% of people aged 18 to 34
favor same-sex marriage, indicating that the demographics clearly favor gay marriage
in the long run, especially given that this is not an issue about which people become
262 See generally Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,”
57 UCLA L. REV. 365 (2009) (exploring the Court’s practice of consulting the majority of
the states to identify and apply constitutional norms).
263 See supra Part I.B.4.
264 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
265 See supra notes 143–56 and accompanying text.
266 See Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same
-sex-marriage-overview.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). A few states had no statutory or
constitutional provisions dealing with same-sex marriage one way or another. See id.; see
also supra Part II.A.1.
267 See, e.g., Steve Sanders, Same-Sex Marriage Symposium: Gay Marriage, Democracy,
and Judicial Review, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 18, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com
/2012/09/same-sex-marriage-symposium-gay-marriage-democracy-and-judicial-review/
(arguing that ballot initiatives on gay marriage are misleading indicators of public opinion be-
cause an under-informed electorate often misunderstands the question presented on the ballot
and because conservative religious groups are overrepresented at the polls, thus “resulting in
policies that may be incongruent with general public attitudes”).
268 See Margaret Talbot, Comment, Wedding Bells, NEW YORKER, May 21, 2012, at 19
(noting that 53% of Americans in 2012 support gay marriage); AP–National Constitution
Center Poll, Aug. 16–20, 2012, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/civil
.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2013) (providing poll results in which 53% of people said they
believed it should be legal for gay and lesbian couples to get married).
269 See Talbot, supra note 268, at 19.
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more conservative as they age.270 Other recent events, such as the repeal of the mili-
tary’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy,271 further indicate that the nation is moving
quickly towards increased respect for homosexuals and homosexual relationships.
The question, then, is how the Court should make sense of complicated, conflict-
ing social attitudes towards homosexuality generally and same-sex marriage more
specifically. One theory is that the Court should care only about suppressing outliers,
policing only state legal regimes that threaten individual rights in ways that are in-
compatible with nationwide legal norms.272 The judiciary’s role, on this view, is not
to spur social change but to bring laggard states up to contemporary norms so that
their anachronistic policies do not continue to harm unpopular groups who happen to
live within those states’ borders. Lawrence easily fits this model,273 but a same-sex
marriage case in 2013 probably would not.
A different approach seeks to anticipate social trends.274 As Professor Klarman
argues, while racial equality and gay rights were highly contentious issues when
Lawrence and Brown v. Board of Education275 were decided, “future trends were not
difficult to predict.”276 Consideration of future trends makes sense to the extent that the
Court cares not just about immediate reactions to its decisions but also its long-term
legitimacy in an evolving cultural landscape. The Court, then, must fear not only get-
ting too far ahead of cultural norms, as it arguably did in Roe, but also issuing a deci-
sion that in short time may be regarded as medieval, as it arguably did in Bowers.277
Lawrence, unfortunately, does little to help navigate these tricky waters. It failed
to explain how the Court should measure public opinion, citing some evidence that
domestic and international norms had shifted against anti-sodomy laws without ex-
plaining the sources’ relative weight or conceding their shortcomings. It also failed
to justify doctrinally why cultural norms should inform constitutional meaning at all,
especially given its claim that Bowers had been wrong all along.278 Nor did Lawrence
address the seeming paradox of protecting minority rights by reference to majoritarian
norms.279 It is therefore entirely unclear exactly how social norms help determine the
existence and scope of constitutional rights.
270 See id.; see also Schacter, supra note 260, at 1220 (noting that same-sex marriage polls
reflect greater support over time because younger people are “far more likely” to support it).
271 See Elisabeth Bumiller, A Final Phase for Ending ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 2011, at A13.
272 See Klarman, supra note 37, at 483.
273 Sunstein, supra note 35, at 27 (arguing that the law at issue in Lawrence was “hopelessly
out of touch with existing social convictions”).
274 See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 119.
275 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
276 Klarman, supra note 37, at 483.
277 Cf. Lain, supra note 120, at 132–33.
278 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
279 See supra Part I.B.4.
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Given the importance of public opinion, it could very well be that a same-sex
marriage case may turn primarily on when the Court decides the case. If the Court
were to determine the constitutionality of all same-sex marriage bans in Perry, it likely
would be considering the matter when fewer than twenty percent of all states grant
same-sex marriage rights. Were the Court to wait another five or ten years, the land-
scape would likely look very different. The legal background also would likely change.
The Court may choose not to resolve the marriage question definitively in Perry, but
its treatment of the issues in that case and in Windsor obviously could have a substan-
tial impact on its future legal analysis as well as on public opinion itself.280
The Court’s awareness of these long-term issues may figure into its short-term
calculations.281 In particular, Justices supporting a constitutional right to same-sex
marriage might prefer to dispose of Perry on standing or narrow substantive grounds,
because it would be harder to declare same-sex marriage a federal constitutional right
when fewer than ten states permit it. This is, of course, all speculation, and surely
many other factors figure into the Justices’ thought processes. Nevertheless, given that
some of the Justices seem influenced by public opinion, it is certainly possible that
various Justices’ perceptions of these trends may affect their approaches to Perry and
other related cases.
***
It should be clear by now that the Court’s approach to same-sex marriage is hard
to predict, not just because this is a doctrinal question of first impression,282 but also
because the Court has offered so little guidance on many of the inquiries likely to
arise. The legal uncertainty resulting from Lawrence’s stealth determinations is hardly
confined to same-sex marriage cases. Cases like Windsor, challenging DOMA, for
instance, also will turn partially on how the Court frames the issue, selects the tier
of scrutiny, evaluates public opinion, and so on.283 Similarly, cases presenting less
weighty matters, such as those involving the constitutionality of sex-toy bans, have also
spawned confusion as lower courts struggle to determine how to apply Lawrence.284
280 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the Jurisprudence
of Civil Unions, 64 ALB. L. REV. 853, 877 (2001) (“[L]aw cannot liberalize unless public opin-
ion moves, but public attitudes can be influenced by changes in the law.”); supra Part I.B.4.
281 See supra notes 18–21.
282 It is highly unlikely that the Court will consider its summary dismissal of the appeal in
Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), binding or even persuasive in a contemporary same-sex
marriage case. In Baker, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the U.S. Constitution does
not protect the right for same-sex couples to marry. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185
(Minn. 1971). The U.S. Supreme Court upheld that ruling, dismissing the appeal, without
explanation, “for want of [a] substantial federal question.” Baker, 409 U.S. at 810.
283 See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786
(2012); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
284 Compare Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233, 1236–38 (11th Cir. 2004)
(upholding an Alabama law prohibiting the sale of sex toys), with Reliable Consultants, Inc. v.
Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 743–47 (5th Cir. 2008) (relying on Lawrence to hold unconstitutional
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Indeed, though they disagree on Lawrence’s meaning, lower courts do seem to agree
that Lawrence is “broad and vague”285 and offers little instruction on how to proceed.
III. EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
A. Stealth Determinations and Meta-Constitutionalism
It is important to emphasize that stealth determinations are not merely litigation
strategies to be exploited by savvy advocates and partisan judges. Underlying many
of these determinations are much larger constitutional principles that recur across
constitutional cases. The Court, for instance, will often have to determine how broadly
or narrowly to construe an asserted right. As we have seen, the Court has failed to ap-
proach this issue consistently,286 sometimes construing the right broadly, sometimes
narrowly. This inconsistency is significant, because at stake is a much broader prin-
ciple of whether our Constitution ultimately favors individual liberties or democratic
mandates when the two collide in close cases.287 The U.S. Constitution stands for both
principles of liberty and democracy.288 Some cases, like Lawrence, ostensibly pit these
two principles against each other, because a democratically enacted law invades the
unenumerated liberty of certain people. In such cases, the Court must ultimately de-
cide whether to impose its own vision of liberty or to allow majority rule to prevail.
The first approach risks short-circuiting important democratic deliberation and poten-
tially triggering a backlash.289 The second risks depriving individuals of important
liberty interests and harming unpopular social groups. Both sides in such cases can
point to the Constitution to support their position, and yet the Court has offered no sys-
tematic way for thinking about resolving this collision. Because the Court resolves
stealthily questions about the appropriate level of generality, we have minimal guid-
ance from the Court about whether, in a close case, liberty or democracy should break
an apparent tie.290 Of course, in some ways, fundamental rights are particularly suited
a Texas statute making it a crime to promote or sell sexual devices). As Professor Strader noted,
“[t]he battle over Lawrence’s meaning could not be more clearly framed than it is in the sex
toy circuit split.” J. Kelly Strader, Lawrence’s Criminal Law, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 41,
99 (2011).
285 Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355, 356 (5th Cir. 2008) (Jones, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
286 See supra Parts I.B.1 & II.B.1.
287 See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 70, at 1058 (“The more abstractly one states the already-
protected right, the more likely it becomes that the claimed right will fall within its protection.”).
288 Cf. Jane S. Schacter, Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 737, 754 (2004)
(“[T]he Constitution equally helps to shape democracy when it singles out for protection
ideas like equality, liberty, and citizenship—core democratic concepts that are enshrined in
the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
289 See generally Eskridge, supra note 59, at 1293–318.
290 See HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY M. KENNEDY
ON LIBERTY xvi–xvii (2009) (describing Justice Kennedy’s approach to resolving of conflicts
between government and individual liberties).
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to case-by-case adjudication, so it is understandable that the Court would not want to
issue precise instructions that would bind it in future cases. That being said, more care-
ful attention to how the Court determines the level of generality could still add greater
consistency to this area without irrevocably tying its hands in all future substantive
due process cases.
Different stealth determinations obscure other meta-issues. When the Court decides
whether to apply the tiers of scrutiny or whether to blur doctrinal categories into hybrid
rights, it is implicitly making judgments about how formalistically judges should apply
constitutional doctrine. Similarly, when the Court measures public opinion, it is con-
sidering more broadly how majoritarian our courts should be when they interpret the
Constitution. These are fundamental constitutional questions, and yet the Court’s
stealth determinations usually only brusquely allude to them in passing. It is true that
these are difficult questions, and a one-size-fits-all approach to them would likely be
inadequate. That said, these questions can shape constitutional outcomes in significant
ways, so by failing to grapple with them in a thoughtful, honest way, judges not only
create great legal uncertainty for future important cases like same-sex marriage but also
neglect to develop a coherent, rigorous constitutional vision.
Of course, were the Court to reduce any of these determinations down to more law-
like analyses and tests, Justices would then enjoy flexibility in how to apply those
tests. In this sense, calls for more careful treatment of stealth determinations might re-
sult in an endless, Escher-like reduction of analyses fleshing out prior analyses. But it
is important to note that we are nowhere near that point. The Court’s failings in these
areas are not minute, but broad and global. These are big-picture meta-questions that
animate many constitutional cases, and yet the Court casually offers answers that do
not begin to explore the larger issues at stake. To that extent, the Court could shed
considerable light on these matters by discussing the general considerations it brings
to such determinations without laying down rigid rules that might unduly constrain
it in future cases.
B. Explanations
There are, of course, explanations for the Court’s failure to theorize these stealth
determinations more carefully. First, these stealth determinations may reflect the
Court’s preference to keep its options open in future cases.291 More rigorous explication
291 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 3–11 (1999) (arguing in favor of constitutional doctrines in which courts decide cases
narrowly); Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 363–64 (2006)
(“In many domains, sensible people take small steps in order to preserve their options, aware
as they are that large steps can have unintended bad consequences, particularly if they are
difficult to reverse. In law, wide rulings might produce outcomes that judges will come to
regret.”); Sunstein, supra note 29, at 7 (arguing that judicial minimalism reduces the costs
of decision and the costs of mistake).
2013] LAWRENCE’S STEALTH CONSTITUTIONALISM 809
of certain determinations can sometimes inadvertently tie the judiciary’s hands in future
cases. Short term minimalism, in other words, enhances long-term flexibility. Judges
value this flexibility in all cases, but it is arguably especially important in the area of
individual rights, because different cases present different considerations for which
rigid doctrinal structures do not always account sufficiently. In Glucksberg, for in-
stance, several concurring Justices noted that while they were unwilling to invalidate
Washington’s prohibition on assisted suicide, similar laws might be unconstitutional
in different circumstances.292 Judges, in other words, will be wary of erecting doctrine
that deprives them of the authority to weigh properly the various nuances presented
in each case.
Second, sometimes the Justice writing the majority opinion muddies the analysis
to retain five votes. Five (or more) Justices may sometimes agree on an outcome in a
case without agreeing on the underlying reasoning. As Professor Sunstein has argued,
under-theorized agreements provide a coalition of Justices with a way of holding to-
gether such fragile majorities.293
Third, the Court simply does not have the time or space to address each determi-
nation in detail. U.S. Supreme Court opinions already tend to be long. Were the Court
to explain carefully its resolution of each determination rendered en route to its hold-
ing, its opinions would be even longer, a result that may further decrease its already
shrinking docket. Moreover, an additional intricate web of “sub-doctrine” dealing with
matters like levels of generality and public opinion may add still more confusion to
constitutional law, an area already criticized for indeterminancy.294
Fourth, stealth determinations may reflect the peculiarities of a particular Justice’s
style. This charge is perhaps especially relevant for Lawrence, which was authored
by Justice Kennedy, whose Lawrence opinion has often been criticized for analytical
imprecision.295 There is some fairness to the argument; some of Lawrence’s ambigu-
ities may be attributable to Justice Kennedy.296 Similarly, the opinion’s attention to
292 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring);
id. at 739 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
293 See Sunstein, supra note 30, at 1171 (“Incompletely theorized agreements help to pro-
duce judgments on relative particulars amidst conflict on relative abstractions.”).
294 See, e.g., MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 5–6 (2004) (referring to constitutional
law as “generally quite indeterminate”).
295 See Gary D. Allison, Sanctioning Sodomy: The Supreme Court Liberates Gay Sex and
Limits State Power To Vindicate the Moral Sentiments of the People, 39 TULSA L. REV. 95, 151
(2003) (“It would be difficult to over-criticize the disorganization and lack of clarity of Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion [in Lawrence].”); Lund & McGinnis, supra note 6, at 1585.
296 See Neal Devins, Ideological Cohesion and Precedent (or Why the Court Only Cares
About Precedent When Most Justices Agree with Each Other), 86 N.C. L. REV. 1399, 1410
(2008) (“[T]he competing decisionmaking styles of Justices Kennedy and O’Connor were on
full display in Lawrence.”); Heather K. Gerken, Larry and Lawrence, 42 TULSA L. REV. 843,
847 (2007) (“Justice Kennedy’s penchant for abstraction conceals some analytic slippage that
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dignity, while certainly justifiable,297 reflects Justice Kennedy’s defensible but rather
idiosyncratic constitutionalism.298 However, one should not overstate the Kennedy
factor.299 Stealth determinations, after all, recur across cases, including many authored
by different Justices.300
Fifth, insofar as stealth determinations lead to less doctrinalized opinions, they
also may help the Court speak to a broader audience than usual. Lawrence reads like
a hybrid document, part legal decision, part human rights manifesto. It seems directed
as much at New York Times readers as at judges and lawyers.301 Though we tend not
to think of judicial opinions’ broad audience, it makes sense that the Court would
think in these terms in certain cases. As Professor Robert Post has argued, the Court’s
“success in influencing public opinion” helps determine its legal authority.302 Lawrence
involved easily understood but highly contested norms. It is quite possible, then, that
the Court wanted to speak about these issues to a broad audience using accessible lan-
guage less encumbered by doctrinal technicalities. Relatedly, to the extent the Court
emphasized the dignity argument, it advanced points that did not fit easily within
existing case law.303
Finally, and along similar lines, stealth determinations may enable the Court to
vindicate public norms in a way that a more straightforward doctrinal approach might
not. The Lawrence Court ultimately seems to have been most persuaded that cultural
changes had seriously eroded the “foundations of Bowers.”304 These cultural shifts are
not mere intellectual abstractions but also shape the Justices’ own life experiences.
Whereas Justice Powell in 1986 did not believe he had ever met a homosexual,305
would have been evident had the [Lawrence] opinion been written in the finest tradition of
common law judging.”). Readers respond to this style differently. Compare Barnett, supra
note 56, at 40 (describing Lawrence as a “simple, indeed elegant, ruling”), and Sherry, supra
note 136, at 1000 (arguing that Lawrence “perfectly exemplifies . . . sound constitutional
doctrine”), with Lund & McGinnis, supra note 6, at 1557 (referring to Lawrence as “a tissue
of sophistries embroidered with a bit of sophomoric philosophizing”).
297 See Yoshino, supra note 81, at 749–50.
298 See Monaghan, supra note 236, at 716 n.294 (noting that Justice Kennedy seems to have
taken up the “human dignity” mantle); Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection:
Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1736–45 (2008) (noting
that dignity is an important constitutional value for Justice Kennedy).
299 Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV.
1, 22–23 (1979) (arguing that “collectivity” is an aspect of the Court’s work but that each
opinion also reflects the views of the authoring Justice).
300 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 9, at 525–26, 530.
301 I thank Pam Karlan for this observation.
302 See Post, supra note 86, at 107.
303 See Yoshino, supra note 81, at 749–50 (arguing that because of the “formal distinction”
between liberty and equality claims, the Court undervalued dignity values); supra Part I.B.2.
304 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003).
305 See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 521 (1994). In reality, Justice
Powell said this to a closeted gay clerk. Id.
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by 2003, the Justices all likely knew openly gay people.306 This shift in personal ex-
perience was likely to change the Justices’ collective attitudes and increase hostility
towards anti-gay legislation.307 These non-legal factors necessarily helped shape the
outcome in Lawrence. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once observed:
[t]he felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had
a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed.308
C. Stealth Determinations, Rule of Law, and Judicial Legitimacy
1. Transparency, Candor, and Rule-of-Law Problems
However convincing we find the explanations for stealth determinations, we must
also consider their costs and benefits. Stealth determinations undermine norms com-
monly associated with the rule of law like transparency, consistency and predictability.
These determinations are opaque, inadequately justified, and erratically applied. The
Supreme Court has no consistent methodology for considering levels of generality, the
role of public opinion, or the interaction of different constitutional norms like liberty
and equality. It has said more about the tiers of scrutiny, but in Lawrence it dispensed
with that analysis altogether. The Court’s approach to these determinations, then, fol-
lows no clear, consistent approach, and thus creates great legal uncertainty.309
306 See Linda Greenhouse, What Got into the Court? What Happens Next?, 57 ME. L. REV.
1, 8 (2005) (explaining that Lawrence reflects not just changes in American society since
Bowers but also changes within the Court including openly gay Supreme Court law clerks
and employees).
307 Psychological research demonstrates that prejudice against minorities, including gay
people, decreases significantly when members of the majority knowingly have contact with that
minority group. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. FRANZOI, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 266–68 (3d ed. 2003);
KENNETH J. GERGEN & MARY M. GERGEN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 141 (1981); Familiarity
Encourages Acceptance, 11 PUB. PERSPECTIVE 31 (2000); Gregory M. Herek & Eric K. Glunt,
Interpersonal Contact and Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward Gay Men: Results from a
National Survey, 30 J. SEX RES. 239 (1993); Gregory M. Herek & John P. Capitanio, “Some
of My Best Friends”: Intergroup Contact, Concealable Stigma, and Heterosexuals’ Attitudes
Toward Gay Men and Lesbians, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 412 (1996);
Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, Does Intergroup Contact Reduce Prejudice?, in
REDUCING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 93, 109–10 (Stuart Oskamp ed., 2000).
308 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co.
1881).
309 See Berger, supra note 9, at 470–82; supra Parts I.B & II.B.
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Legal philosophers disagree on how to define and describe the “rule of law,”310 but
many agree that the processes through which law is made should be open and that the
law itself should be accessible, understandable, relatively stable, and consistent with
other laws.311 While many discussions of the “rule of law” often focus on the creation
of statutes and rules, the same principles of openness, stability, and consistency can
also apply to Supreme Court constitutional decisionmaking, which, for better or
worse, creates much of the substance of our constitutional law.312
Admittedly, given that our constitutional text is short and that many provisions
are ambiguous and/or vague, some uncertainty is inevitable.313 Some judicial discre-
tion, then, is inescapable in our system. Still, the Court’s unpredictable, inconsistent,
under-theorized approach to these determinations in Lawrence and elsewhere injects
more uncertainty and judicial discretion to an area of law already prone to judicial
manipulation.314 Lawrence, for instance, did not articulate the tier of scrutiny at all,
notwithstanding the tiers’ centrality to equal-protection and substantive due process
analysis. Nor did it even acknowledge departing from the typical doctrinal framework.
Lawrence similarly failed to elucidate the factors guiding the level of generality or the
relevance of cultural norms to constitutional meaning. As a result of this opacity, it is
hard to “foresee with fair certainty” how the Court will approach these kinds of deter-
minations in future cases and, consequently, constitutional law more generally.315
To be clear, stealth determinations go well past the point of judicial minimalism,
which some scholars have championed as a means of promoting democracy by deciding
310 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (1997) (arguing that scholars use the phrase “rule of
law” in very different ways).
311 See FULLER, supra note 15, at 39; RAZ, supra note 15, at 213. Professor Raz has been
critical of Fuller’s principles of legality, see, e.g., RAZ, supra note 15, at 224, but the intricacies
of the disagreement are beyond the scope of this Article.
312 Cf. Bruce Chapman, The Rational and the Reasonable: Social Choice Theory and
Adjudication, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 43 (1994) (explaining that judicial law making by an
appellate court “is typically stated in general terms, and its authority is intended to extend
beyond the confines of its own particular facts to other like cases”).
313 See Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Discretion in Constitutional Cases, 26 J.L. & POL. 123,
124 (2011) (discussing the fact that judges must make interpretive decisions when deciding
constitutional issues).
314 See ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS 4 (2012) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s criteria
in constitutional cases “are much more about subjectivity and taste than logic and reason”).
315 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944) (“[G]overnment in all its
actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to
foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circum-
stances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.”); see also Fuller,
supra note 15, at 63 (“[C]larity represents one of the most essential ingredients of legality.”);
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897) (arguing
that the object of legal study “is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force
through the instrumentality of the courts”).
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cases modestly.316 It is one thing to decide cases narrowly so as not to answer substan-
tive questions that can be left for another day. It is something quite different to decline
to explain the resolution of numerous quasi-methodological questions almost certain
to recur, thereby obfuscating the interpretive methods and techniques that commonly
determine constitutional meaning and application.317
The Court’s failure to approach these determinations with even general standards,
let alone precise rules,318 suggests that it is not providing a candid, transparent account
of its reasoning behind some decisions.319 As a result, critical readers are likely to sus-
pect that the Court’s written opinions do not fully acknowledge the norms actually
driving the case’s outcome.320 Were Lawrence, for instance, really guided by its level-
of-generality or public-opinion determinations, we would expect more careful explica-
tion of those determinations, which would help guide future courts confronted with
similar questions.321 That the Court obscured rather than elucidated its reasoning may
suggest that norms, rather than legal principles, were driving the decision.322
To some extent, the Court’s inclination to conceal the powerful role of norms in
its decisionmaking is understandable.323 Normative choices, after all, are more contest-
able than factual or legal ones, so a candid acknowledgment that individual values
and perceptions of cultural trends weighed heavily in a decision would raise serious
316 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 291, at 3–74.
317 Cf. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1964) (“[T]here is an obligation
to decide in some cases; there is a limit beyond which avoidance devices cannot be pressed and
constitutional dicta cannot be urged without enervating principle to an impermissible degree.”).
318 See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
319 See Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms
in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2097–98 (2011) (discussing judicial
candor); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 723, 743 (1988) (“Because a coherent rationale for the intermittent invocation of stare
decisis has not been forthcoming, the impression is created that the doctrine is invoked only as
a mask hiding other considerations.”).
320 Cf. Goldberg, supra note 100, at 1962 (“[J]udicial focus on facts and elision of nor-
mative judgments obscures, but does not eliminate, the influence of social norms on both the
analysis and outcomes.”).
321 Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 196, at 228–32 (analogizing judicial interpretation to a “chain
novel” in which the author must make “[j]udgments about textual coherence and integrity”).
322 Cf. Posner, supra note 17, at 40 (“[O]nly on the basis of a political judgment, and a
political judgment cannot be called right or wrong by reference to legal norms.”).
323 See Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493, 594 (2006) (discussing judicial reluctance to explicitly balance
normative factors); Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?,
97 CORNELL L. REV. 191, 228 (2012) (“While judges . . . may . . . acknowledge multivariate
influences on judicial decision making privately or even in stage whispers, they do so openly
at [their] peril . . . .”).
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questions about whether the Court actually is governed by the law.324 Nevertheless,
many critics contend that judges owe society precisely that sort of candor.325 Only open
explanations for judicial decisions can bind the judge in the next case, and decisions
that cannot bind the judge are of questionable legal value. As Professor Charles Fried
puts it:
The wise judge . . . tries to judge in an objective, not personal, way.
That is why he presses himself to explain, to be candid, to lay out
all that went into his conclusion. In explaining, he opens himself
to criticism, to refutation, but he also offers up hostages to the
future—today’s explanation binds him to explain why today’s
reasons are not also good tomorrow.326
When courts obscure their normative influences with stealth determinations, the
resulting lack of transparency is problematic, because it suggests that we cannot trust
the Court’s own explanations.327 Perhaps even more disturbingly, it suggests that the
Court may not fully believe its explanations itself.328 Collectively, stealth determina-
tions, then, create the impression that the Court’s explanations for their constitutional
decisions are mere “fig lea[ves] deployed to obscure partisan purposes.”329
This impression raises still more rule-of-law questions. Many scholars, after all,
contend that the rule of law depends on people looking “outside [their] own will for
criteria of judgment.”330 Rule of law, in other words, depends partially on governance
by impartial legal principles rather than individual normative or political judgments.331
We expect that judges will make decisions based on neutral principles with “confident
evaluation on the basis of professional legal norms.”332 If judges depart too noticeably
324 See SEGALL, supra note 314, at ix (arguing that the Supreme Court does not behave like
a court).
325 See, e.g., Charles Fried, On Judgment, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1025, 1043 (2011);
Gillian E. Metzger, Tradeoffs of Candor: Does Judicial Transparency Erode Legitimacy?, 64
N.Y.U ANN. SURV. AM. L. 459, 466 (2009) (criticizing the Court’s lack of “overt, normative
engagement with the real issues involved”).
326 Fried, supra note 325, at 1043.
327 See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND
POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 44 (2009) (“While a single bad opinion may not have
immediate concrete consequences, the cumulative effect of a run of unreasoned decisions on
a court’s legitimacy may reduce its actual authority . . . .”).
328 Cf. Monaghan, supra note 299, at 25 (“If justifications cannot be stated in the opinion,
they should not be relied upon in entering the judgment.”).
329 KEITH J. BYBEE, ALL JUDGES ARE POLITICAL—EXCEPT WHEN THEY ARE NOT 35 (2010).
330 CARTER & BURKE, supra note 17, at 146.
331 See id. at 147–49; see also RAZ, supra note 15, at 219 (contrasting the rule of law with
arbitrary power); Bybee, supra 36, at 306 (discussing Carter and Burke).
332 Posner, supra note 17, at 40–41; see also Wechsler, supra note 26.
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from neutral decision-making processes, that departure has adverse consequences not
just for scholars’ abstract conceptions of the rule of law but also possibly for popular
trust in the judiciary. Even if our expectations for judges to divorce their legal judg-
ments from their own normative values are unrealistic,333 the public’s respect for the
judiciary may suffer if it perceives that judges approach many determinations instru-
mentally to further their own partisan preferences.
Judicial adherence (or lack thereof) to the rule-of-law principles discussed here,
then, plays some role, albeit perhaps a limited one, in popular conceptions of and re-
actions to our court system. On this score, the Court’s non-transparent use of stealth
determinations likely plays into public perception that judges are guided by partisan
politics as much as abstract legal principles.334 Admittedly, the general public usually
pays more attention to cases’ outcomes than reasoning, so one should not overstate
stealth determinations’ effect on popular attitudes towards the judiciary. Neverthe-
less, collectively these stealth determinations help create the perception that judges
make up constitutional law as they go.335 This perception that constitutional law is not
constrained by consistent principles, in turn, further contributes to the suspicion that
judges vote their policy preferences, a perception reinforced (whether fairly or not) by
cases like Bush v. Gore.336 Public opinion polls, indeed, routinely show that substantial
majorities of Americans believe that judges are influenced by their own political
preferences.337 That sentiment surely seeps into our popular discourse about the Court.
Though they may not like to admit it, Justices, judges, and (some) scholars need to
start taking seriously the fact the Court’s approach to resolving many constitutional
333 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
609, 671–72 (1990) (arguing that values necessarily infiltrate even a good-faith interpreter’s
“pre-understandings” of legal precedent, text, and “the ongoing story of law”); Lawrence C.
Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis,
88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 203–04 (1989) (discussing the effect that personal views necessarily
have on a judge’s decisions). See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD
235–40 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d Rev. ed. 2004).
334 Cf. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL (1993) (arguing that Justices often vote in ways consistent with their political ideology).
335 Cf. BYBEE, supra note 329, at 5 (“Public confidence in the judiciary ultimately depends
not only on the substance of court rulings but also on the ability of judges to convey the impres-
sion that their decisions are driven by the impersonal requirements of legal principle.”).
336 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also Adam Burton, Pay No Attention to the Men Behind the
Curtain: The Supreme Court, Popular Culture, and the Countermajoritarian Problem, 73
UMKC L. REV. 53, 68 (2004) (describing the Court’s opinion in Bush v. Gore as predictably
split along party lines and raising questions of the Court’s impartiality); William G. Ross,
Bush v. Gore and the Prestige of the Supreme Court: A “Self-Inflicted Wound?,” JURIST
(Dec. 13, 2000), http://web.archive.org/web/20120426010902/http:/jurist.law.pitt.edu/election
/electionross5.htm (commenting that “[e]ach of the Justices moreover favored a position on
federalism that is ostensibly contrary to his or her usual position”).
337 Bybee, supra note 36, at 308 (citing a Maxwell Poll in which 82% of Americans sur-
veyed believed that partisan background of judges influences judicial decisionmaking).
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cases fundamentally undermines the public’s confidence in our system of resolving
disputes about constitutional meaning.338
2. Cultural Norms and the Paradoxes of Judicial Legitimacy
That all being said, it is important to acknowledge that stealth determinations,
paradoxically, may also serve important purposes. The Court’s legal authority derives,
in substantial part, from the general public’s willingness to accept its judgment.339 Had
the Court in Lawrence only considered existing doctrinal structures, it would have been
substantially more difficult to reach the outcome it did, especially on liberty grounds.
The Court explicitly stated that the country’s values on homosexuality had shifted dra-
matically since Bowers was decided,340 and, importantly, many Justices by 2003 held
different views on the subject than they and their predecessors had held in 1986.341 The
Court made use of stealth determinations to steer around doctrinal obstacles and reach
an outcome some Justices likely felt they needed to reach.342 From this perspective,
constitutional doctrine may not always provide the Court with effective resources to
adequately resolve the problems it confronts, and stealth determinations give the Court
flexibility to address important issues the doctrine obscures. On this account, the Court
can use stealth determinations to avoid mindless formalism. This is not to say that the
Constitution can mean anything, but it is to acknowledge that constitutional law’s
legitimacy rests partially on decisions that reflect in various respects the values of the
people themselves. The Constitution, in other words, must rely partially on the people’s
attachment to it.343
To this extent, the Court recognizes that public perception helps determine its in-
stitutional legitimacy.344 While many people’s views of the judiciary are likely shaped
by more than simply whether they like particular results,345 the Court must be attuned
338 See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION 126 (2007) (“When
people know that the law is uncertain, a façade of certainty is an affront to the audience’s
intelligence and sense of fair play.”).
339 See Post, supra note 86, at 10 (“[C]onstitutional law could not plausibly proceed with-
out incorporating the values and beliefs of nonjudicial actors.”).
340 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570 (2003).
341 See CARPENTER, supra note 38, at 180–208.
342 See supra Parts I.A, I.B.4, II.B.4, & III.B.
343 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L.
REV. 815, 846–47 (arguing that the American Constitution’s legitimacy stems in part from the
people’s attachment to it).
344 Cf. Geyh, supra note 323, at 228.
345 See James G. Gimpel & Lewis S. Ringel, Understanding Court Nominee Evaluation and
Approval: Mass Opinion in the Bork and Thomas Cases, 17 POL. BEHAVIOR 135, 137 (1995)
(listing five categories the public uses to evaluate Justices, including specific issues, ideological
orientation, competence, institutional deference, and nonpolitical characteristics, such as in-
tegrity or character); Marla N. Greenstein, Maintaining Public Confidence in the Integrity
2013] LAWRENCE’S STEALTH CONSTITUTIONALISM 817
to cultural values to retain its institutional legitimacy, especially in a case as norma-
tively charged as Lawrence.346 Cultural norms, then, not only help explain why the
Court resorts to stealth determinations,347 but also may help the Court arrive at rulings
that enhance its own legitimacy.
By adding an additional layer of uncertainty to constitutional law, the Court’s
stealth determinations also may incidentally protect courts from overreaching by al-
lowing some questions to percolate in the political branches. When constitutional
questions remain unanswered, the political branches and the general public can debate
constitutional meaning. While such engagement can sometimes result in tyranny of
the majority, it also typically produces results that are more democratically legitimate
than those issued by unelected judges in the first instance.348 Some Americans disliked
the Lawrence decision, but even they may have taken solace in the fact that the Court’s
muddy analysis left open for debate many important, related questions, both substantive
(such as the constitutional status of same-sex marriage bans) and methodological (such
as the role of public opinion in constitutional adjudication). Admittedly, this kind of
popular constitutional discourse may often happen anyway, and courts hewing more
closely to the doctrinal path can also craft narrow decisions. Nevertheless, because
stealth determinations leave unanswered so many constitutional questions, they im-
plicitly punt more issues back to the political branches and the people.
Interestingly, though, while Lawrence appears highly cognizant of cultural trends
and seems to direct some of its discussion to a broad lay audience,349 it does not entirely
abandon more technical legal language. In addition to the more accessible language dis-
cussed above, Lawrence also included less accessible terms like “levels of generality,”
“stare decisis,” and “substantive due process.”350 These terms sound arid and law-like.
This is no accident. While the Court’s opinion does speak in places to the general pub-
lic, its use of more technical terms also strengthens its own control over constitutional
content. By rooting its analysis in ostensibly impartial, legal language the Court asserts
its own hegemony over constitutional meaning.351
The Court’s approach in Lawrence, thus, simultaneously advances and obstructs
judicial legitimacy. The Court’s ad hoc treatment of various recurring sub-doctrinal
and Impartiality of the Courts, 48 JUDGES’ J. 40 (2009) (identifying public confidence in the
impartiality of courts as an important aspect of public approval).
346 Cf. Post, supra note 86, at 76 (arguing that the Court’s constitutional law “draws in-
spiration . . . and legitimacy from constitutional culture”).
347 See supra notes 301–08 and accompanying text.
348 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
349 See supra Part III.B.
350 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
351 Cf. Post, supra note 86, at 58 (“By deliberately formulating the question of consti-
tutionality in this technical legal way, which is conspicuously impervious to the terms [of]
the debate . . . in constitutional culture, the Court facilitates its own control over [consti-
tutional meaning].”).
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questions undermines legal consistency and faith in a predictable, impartial legal sys-
tem, but its attention to cultural norms nevertheless helps bolster popular support for the
its decisions. Its reliance on concepts like dignity, which the doctrine undervalued,
helps speak to a broader audience, but its retention of legalese also helps it maintain
control over constitutional meaning. Its ostensible “resolution” of stealth determinations
pretends to be law-like and principled, but it also draws heavily and, in places, openly
on values and politics.
Stealth determinations, then, illustrate Professor Keith Bybee’s observation that
judges’ work can simultaneously “sustain and undermine their claims to legitimacy.”352
These determinations’ ostensible impartiality can help retain faith in judicial dispute
resolution. Legal language’s appearance of impartiality, after all, is part of what attracts
people to the judicial system for resolving their disputes.353 But it is nevertheless im-
possible for impartial principles to guide the law alone. Cultural norms will necessarily
color the way people, including judges, view justice and the law. However impartial
they try to be, judges, as human beings, cannot wholly divorce their own values from
their rulings, especially in close cases about which reasonable people can differ on
the correct legal outcome.354 As Holmes once observed, “[t]he language of judicial
decision is mainly the language of logic. . . . [But] [b]ehind the logical form lies a
judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing [principles], often an
inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of
the whole proceeding.”355
The Court’s stealth determinations reflect these inarticulate judgments. They may
corrode trust in the judiciary insofar as they suggest that judges are making up the law
to suit their normative preferences, but they can also reinforce judicial legitimacy by
allowing the Court to echo popular norms while ostensibly grounding decisions in legal
language. Stealth determinations certainly do not do this perfectly. Many of Lawrence’s
determinations are easily criticized,356 and as the Court now (perhaps) takes up same-
sex marriage in Perry, attention to Lawrence’s (and other cases’) opacity helps high-
light just how many points of analysis are open to debate. We should therefore not be
surprised that the general public is skeptical of judicial impartiality.357 Nevertheless,
352 Bybee, supra note 36, at 314.
353 See BYBEE, supra note 329, at 4.
354 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 324, 345–53 (1990) (discussing the hermeneutical and prac-
tical traditions in legal interpretations and the fact that “different values will pull the interpreter
in different directions”); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of
Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 305 (2004) (finding that in many
areas “the political party of the appointing president is a fairly good predictor of how individual
judges will vote”).
355 Holmes, supra note 315, at 465–66.
356 See, e.g., Lund & McGinnis, supra note 6, at 1557 (describing Lawrence as “a paragon
of the most anticonstitutional branch of constitutional law”).
357 See Bybee, supra note 36, at 306.
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stealth determinations’ ultimate impact on popular views of the judiciary is more com-
plicated. Indeed, many of the same polls indicating that people believe judges to be par-
tisan also show, paradoxically, that Americans believe in the impartiality of judges.358
Stealth determinations, then, reflect the paradoxes of a judicial system that is an
arena of both principle and of bias.359 They embody what Professor Thurman Arnold
identified decades ago as a contradictory judicial system consisting at once of political
decisionmaking and impartial legal principles,360 helping illuminate and explain the
contradictory views Americans have about the Supreme Court’s constitutional judg-
ments. At the end of the day, these determinations’ cost to the rule of law may out-
weigh their benefits. They are so haphazard, ad hoc, and unpredictable that observers
are likely to point to them to argue that the Justices invent constitutional law to serve
their partisan values. Still, they also provide the Justices with breathing space to account
for real world considerations and reach decisions they deem wise, and that flexibility
may sometimes fortify the very judicial legitimacy they simultaneously undermine,
especially on matters about which the country has reached a rough consensus.361
CONCLUSION
Students of constitutional law typically learn the subject through doctrinal catego-
ries organized according to the Constitution’s various textual provisions. However,
much of the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisionmaking occurs not within these
well-known doctrinal structures, but through stealth determinations, which shape the
outcome of many cases but lack consistent, theorized explanations. We have no vol-
ume systematically considering these stealth determinations, but perhaps we should.
Because stealth determinations play such an important role in the Court’s constitu-
tional decisionmaking, it is sometimes hard to know both the implications of particular
Court decisions and the answer to fundamental interpretive questions. Lawrence v.
Texas nicely illustrates the phenomenon. In that case, the Court rendered several stealth
determinations, obscuring most of its reasoning. Consequently, it is very difficult to
know how that opinion affects future cases, such as same-sex marriage litigation, which
will likely require the resolution of similar determinations. Indeed, examined through
the lens of stealth determinations, Lawrence sheds remarkably little light on the pending
Perry case, or much of anything else. Of course, it would be impractical and probably
unwise to try to resolve these determinations with code-like specificity, but greater
methodological explication, consistency, and self-consciousness would improve the
status quo while still retaining ample flexibility for the Court.
358 See id. at 307.
359 See BYBEE, supra note 329, at 6–10.
360 See THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 8–9 (1935); Bybee, supra
note 36, at 319 (discussing Arnold’s The Symbols of Government).
361 Cf. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 34 (2010) (“American constitu-
tional law is about precedents, and when the precedents leave off, it is about commonsense
notions of fairness and good policy.”).
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Stealth determinations, then, add even more uncertainty to constitutional law,
an area already known for indeterminacy. Interestingly, in so doing, these determi-
nations simultaneously undermine and reinforce judicial legitimacy. On the one hand,
these determinations contribute to the widespread belief that partisan preferences rather
than impartial legal principles dictate the outcomes of many Supreme Court constitu-
tional cases. On the other hand, these determinations can also help reinforce judicial
legitimacy by helping Justices account for public norms and emphasize arguments
likely to appeal to lay audiences. Stealth determinations, then, play an important but
contradictory role in the Court’s constitutional decisionmaking.
